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Articles 
“DOCILE BODIES” OR REBELLIOUS SPIRITS?:   
ISSUES OF TIME AND POWER IN THE 
WAIVER AND WITHDRAWAL OF DEATH 
PENALTY APPEALS 
Avi Brisman∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This past term, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in 
the case of Baze v. Rees regarding the use of the tri-chemical “cocktail” 
used to execute inmates on death row—sodium thiopental (also known 
as sodium pentothal, an ultra-short acting barbiturate to render the 
individual unconscious), pancuronium bromide (also known as Pavulon, 
which causes muscle paralysis), and potassium chloride (to stop the 
heart).1  In Baze, the petitioners neither challenged the constitutionality of 
the use of lethal injection, in particular, nor the penalty of capital 
punishment, as a whole.  In fact, even if the Supreme Court had ruled in 
favor of Ralph Baze and Thomas C. Bowling, the two Kentucky inmates 
                                                 
∗ J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; M.F.A., Pratt Institute; B.A., Oberlin 
College. Former Law Clerk to the Honorable Alan S. Gold, United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Florida, and to the Honorable Ruth V. McGregor, then Vice Chief 
Justice and currently Chief Justice, Arizona Supreme Court.  An embryonic version of this 
article was presented at the 35th Annual Conference, Western Society of Criminology, in 
Sacramento, CA, on February 16, 2008.  I am grateful to my copanelists and members of the 
audience for their comments and questions.  In addition, I would like to thank Samantha 
Gottlieb for her insights and suggestions on an earlier version of this Article.  Finally, I 
would like to thank the following members of the Valparaiso University Law Review for 
their assistance in preparing this Article for publication: Matthew Chandler, Carrie Flores, 
and Melina Villalobos. 
1 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1527, 1532–153 (2008). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices 
to Enter the Debate over Lethal Injection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at A24; Linda Greenhouse, 
Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A1; Gilbert 
King, Cruel and Unusual History, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A21; Adam Liptak, 
Moratorium May Be Over, but Hardly the Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A26; Mark 
Sherman, Supreme Court Upholds Use of Lethal Injections, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 16, 2008, 
http://a.abcnews.com/TheLaw/SCOTUS/wireStory?id=4664276; Editorial, The Death 
Penalty Returns, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2008, at A26; Editorial, The Supreme Court Fine-Tunes 
Pain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at A28. See generally Linda Greenhouse, After a 32-Year 
Journey, Justice Stevens Renounces Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A22; 
Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Already Split, Commence Work on a Polarizing New Docket, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2007, at A17; Elizabeth Weil, It’s Not Whether To Kill, but How, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 2007, at WK3. 
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who brought the challenge to the state’s lethal injection protocol, the 
result would not have overturned their death sentences (or the sentence 
of any other death row inmates for that matter). 
The issue in the case was limited to the standard that courts use to 
evaluate whether a method of execution violates the Eighth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.2  What lay in the balance then was, at 
most, a requirement that states employ a different method for carrying 
out executions.3 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld Kentucky’s method of 
execution, holding that “[a] stay of execution may not be 
granted . . . unless the condemned prisoner establishes that the State’s 
lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain[,]” 
and that the petitioners had not established that the risks were “so 
                                                 
2 Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
means for carrying out a method of execution that create an “‘unnecessary risk’ of pain” or 
only a “‘substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture[,] or lingering 
death.’”  Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1529; See also Greenhouse, Justices to Enter the Debate over Lethal 
Injection, supra note 1, at A20; Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case, 
supra note 1, at A1, A18; King, supra note 1, at A25; Liptak, Moratorium May Be Over, but 
Hardly the Challenges, supra note 1, at A18; Sherman, supra note 1; Editorial, The Supreme 
Court Fine-Tunes Pain, supra note 1, at A26.  See generally Mark Essig, This Is Going To Hurt, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2007, at 415; Greenhouse, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens 
Renounces Capital Punishment, supra note 1, at 24;. Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is 
Bucking Execution Trend, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2007, at A1; Kirk Semple, Judge Stays 
Execution, Citing Case Under Review, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2007, at A24; Weil, supra note 1, at 
WK3.  In addition, the Supreme Court considered:  1) whether carrying out an execution 
causes “unnecessary risk of pain and suffering” in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
upon a showing that readily available alternatives that pose less risk of pain and suffering 
could be used, and 2) whether continued use of the current three-drug “cocktail” violates 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment because lethal 
injections can be carried out using other chemicals that pose less risk of pain and suffering.  
Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1520.  See generally Greenhouse, After a 32-Year Journey, Justice Stevens 
Renounces Capital Punishment, supra note 1, at A20; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Stay 
Execution, A Signal to Lower Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at A1; Greenhouse, Justices 
Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky Case, supra note 1, at A1, A18; Linda Greenhouse, Trying 
to Decipher the Justices on the Current State of the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2007, at 
A21; King, supra note 1, at A25; Editorial, The Supreme Court Fine-Tunes Pain, supra note 1, at 
A26.  See also Liptak, Moratorium May Be Over, But Hardly the Challenges, supra note 1, at 
A18; Sherman, supra note 1. 
Note that the Supreme Court’s consideration of issues regarding execution methods, 
rather than abolition, is consistent with the shift in public discourse about capital 
punishment.  See Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics:  Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1265, 1266 (2001). 
3 Ralph Blumenthal & Linda Greenhouse, Texas Planning New Execution Despite Ruling, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at A1 (stating that “[e]ven if the Supreme Court rules in favor of 
the two Kentucky inmates who brought the challenge to lethal injection, the result will not 
be to overturn any death sentences, but rather, at the most, to require a different method to 
carry them out.”).  See also Essig, supra note 2, at 415; Weil, supra note 1, at WK3. 
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substantial or imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment 
violation.”4  Chief Justice Roberts wrote in his controlling opinion, 
“Simply because an execution method may result in pain, either by 
accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish 
the sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that qualifies as cruel and 
unusual.”5  Despite this ruling, the potential impact of the case is still 
quite broad and may well affect a category of death row inmates6 (in 
what Michael Tonry refers to as a “window of opportunity”7) who often 
fly beneath the public radar in death penalty cases.8 
                                                 
4 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1534, 1537.  See also Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in 
Kentucky Case, supra note 1, at A1, A18; Sherman, supra note 1. 
5 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531. 
6 Some have suggested that the term, “‘death row’” inmate, is pejorative, preferring 
instead “‘capital punishment’” (“CP”) inmate or “capital offenders.”  George Lombardi, 
Richard D. Sluder, & D. Wallace, Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates:  The Missouri 
Experience and Its Legal Significance, 61(2) FED. PROBATION 3, 5 (1997).  See also Cunningham 
& Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement:  A Review of 
Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. LAW 191, 205 (2002).  Such concerns notwithstanding—and 
because “death row inmate” is still commonly used—this Article will use the terms “capital 
offenders,” “capital punishment inmate,” “death row inmate,” “death-sentenced inmate,” 
and “condemned prisoner” interchangeably. 
7 MICHAEL TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME:  SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN AMERICAN PENAL 
CULTURE 94 (2004).  Using Tonry’s formulation, Kudlac, for example, argued that 
“declining support for capital punishment and DNA exonerations opened a ‘window of 
opportunity’ that was followed by prohibitions on executing juveniles and the mentally 
retarded and statewide moratoriums on executions.”  CHRISTOPHER S. KUDLAC, PUBLIC 
EXECUTIONS:  THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE MEDIA 5 (2007).  The suggestion here is that the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Baze may affect the waiver and withdrawal of death penalty 
appeals in the same way that DNA exonerations impacted capital punishment for juveniles 
and the mentally retarded. 
8 See, e.g., BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE:  NATURE, SOURCES, AND REMEDIES 199–200 
(2004).  Forst continues, 
[f]or decades the death penalty fight had been waged principally 
on . . . ethical questions such as whether it is cruel and unusual (from 
the left) or whether lesser punishments are unjust to the victims of 
murder and their survivors (from the right), and empirical questions as 
to whether it deters or brutalizes and whether it is applied in a 
discriminatory manner, especially with regard to the races of the 
defendant and the victim. 
Id.  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, Christian Witness, Moral Anthropology, and the Death Penalty, 
17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541, 544 (2003).  Garnett states, 
the imposition of the death penalty raises a wide variety of challenging, 
provocative, important, and perhaps more practical questions.  For 
example, does the death penalty deter crime?  If so, do the “costs” of 
capital punishment justify its deterrence “benefits?”  How much 
confidence should we have in the accuracy of the results of capital trials, 
and how might we increase that confidence?  How much appellate and 
post-conviction review is necessary, appropriate, and feasible in capital 
cases?  To what extent, if at all, should American constitutional and 
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Since Gregg v. Georgia9—the Supreme Court holding that paved the 
way for the resumption of capital punishment in the United States10—
1,138 executions have been carried out, 131 of which have involved 
“volunteers”11—individuals who waive or withdraw appeals at a point 
                                                                                                             
criminal law relating to the death penalty reflect developments in 
international law, and in the domestic laws of other countries?  Are 
death-eligible defendants provided with adequate legal representation?  
Do prosecutors and jurors discriminate on the basis of race or sex in the 
imposition of the death penalty?  Does the United States Constitution 
require that juries, not judges, make the decision for death, or that some 
convicted murderers—say, those with severe developmental disabilities 
or teenagers—be exempted categorically from execution?  And so on. 
Id. (footnote omitted); White, supra note 2, at 1267–68, 1270 (stating that “[f]or the most 
part, recent discussions have focused on the reliability of the capital punishment system, 
rather than whether the death penalty is right or wrong[,]” and observing that “[t]he 
imperfections of America’s capital punishment system became real when Americans 
learned that innocent people were being sentenced to death and executed for crimes they 
did not commit.”). 
For an illustration of which death penalty cases seem to attract (the most) public 
attention, see, e.g., KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 5–8, 12–13, 65, 83, 145. 
9 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
10 In 1972, following a five-year moratorium on executions, the United States Supreme 
Court held in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that Georgia’s death penalty statute 
violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  In 
Gregg, the Court upheld Georgia’s newly-passed death penalty statute and ruled that the 
death penalty did not always constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  Gary Mark 
Gilmore, executed by firing squad on January 17, 1977, and mentioned infra Parts III & IV, 
was the first person put to death after Gregg.  See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).  For 
a brief overview of U.S. Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence from 1972–76 and the 
relationship of Furman to Gregg, see White, supra note 2, at 1267 n.10. 
11 Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/getexecdata.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2009) (providing death penalty statistics, 
current as of Jan. 15, 2009).  Note that “a significant proportion of defendants charged with 
capital murder express a preference for a death sentence at some point during the course of 
interactions with their attorneys.”  Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. 
REV. 1363, 1380 (1988).  See also Smith v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050, 1052 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(noting that the inmate had “changed his mind about the desirability of post-conviction 
relief at least eight times”); State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86, 103 (Wash. 1992) (Utter, J., 
dissenting) (stating that “[i]t is common for those on death row to express a will to stop 
their appeals and proceed with execution.  Most change their minds and agree to continue 
the appeals process.”); C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided:  Defense Attorneys and the 
Ethics of Death Row Volunteering, 25(3) LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 849, 859 n.16, 862 n.17 (2000) 
[hereinafter Harrington, A Community Divided]; C. Lee Harrington, Mental Competence and 
End-of-Life Decision Making:  Death Row Volunteering and Euthanasia, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 1109, 1109 (2004) [hereinafter Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision 
Making]; Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 853–61 
(1987). 
For example, at various junctures in their respective criminal proceedings, both Aileen 
Wuornos and Timothy McVeigh expressed preferences for the death sentence.  See 
KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 54–55, 63, and 103 (noting that Wuornos expressed a desire to be 
executed on a number of occasions—April 1992, October 1994, and July 2001—but was not 
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when viable claims still exist in their cases.12  “Volunteering” may seem 
like an odd term to employ in the death penalty context,13 given that it 
connotes second graders frantically waiving their hands in response to a 
query from a teacher, do-gooders spending time at a Boys & Girls club, 
or people picking up trash as part of an organized “Park Day” or 
“Neighborhood Improvement Day.”  Indeed, as Harrington writes:  “[I]n 
popular parlance[,] a volunteer is someone who dutifully and nobly 
offers his or her time, energy, services, or body (in this case, quite 
literally) for the common good—volunteering is socially praiseworthy.”14  
But in the context of capital punishment, the term is used to refer to 
individuals who have chosen to forego their appeals of death penalty 
sentences and includes individuals who may hold vastly different 
perspectives on death and the crime(s) for which they are to be 
executed.15 
                                                                                                             
executed until October 2002, and that McVeigh asked for his execution and indicated that 
he would seek no appeals in December 2000—six months before the execution was carried 
out).  More recently, John A. Muhammad, who was convicted of sniper attacks in the 
Washington area in 2002, wrote a letter to prosecutors requesting their help in putting an 
end to his legal appeals from death row.  Virginia:  Sniper Asks To Stop Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 7, 2008, at A24. 
Despite the fact that many defendants charged with capital murder express a 
preference for a death sentence at some point during the course of their proceedings, most 
capital defendants ultimately change their minds and choose not to volunteer.  See Bonnie, 
supra note 11, at 1388 (“Many capital defendants are ambivalent about their preferences 
and vacillate as the trial process unfolds.  In most cases, however, stable preferences 
against execution eventually emerge.”); Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 
850.  See generally Ralph Blumenthal, After Hiatus, Setting a Wave of Executions, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 3, 2008, at A1 (noting the ambivalence of Jack Henry Smith, 70, the oldest Texas 
inmate on death row, who stated, “‘I’d hate to go before my time,’” but admitted that the 
prospect of an end to his confinement might come as a relief). 
12 See Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row:  Unsolved Puzzles for Courts 
and Legislatures, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1169 (2005); Harrington, A Community Divided, 
supra note 11, at 859 n.16; Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, 
supra note 11, at 1124; G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering for Execution:  Competency, 
Voluntariness, and Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 860, 861 
(1983).  Note that instances of “‘volunteering’” occurred before the reinstatement of the 
death penalty in 1976.  Id. at 861 n.8.  Note also that “‘volunteer[ring]’” can refer to 
individuals who argue for and attempt to procure the death penalty as a punishment from 
the beginning of the criminal justice process.  See Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1379–80.  See also 
Urofsky, M. I, A Right to Die:  Termination of Court Appeals for Condemned Prisoners, 75 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 553–82 (1984) (554–62, especially). 
13 Sometimes “consensual executions” is used in lieu of “volunteering.”  See Harrington, 
A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850. 
14 Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1122. 
15 See David A. Davis, Capital Cases:  When the Defendant Wants To Die, THE CHAMPION 45, 
45–47 (June 1992); Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 860; Harrington, 
Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1110–11. 
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A number of medical anthropologists and sociologists have explored how death has 
multiple meanings.  For example, Margaret Lock, in her ethnographic inquiry into North 
American and Japanese ontologies of death and the politics of organ transplants, asked 
whether death is an event or a process, and stated that the concept of, and criteria for, 
death are culturally determined: 
professional consensus has been lacking as to whether death is a 
moment or a process and how best to determine when it occurs.  No 
consensus exists even as to whether a definition of death should be 
applicable to all living forms or whether there can be a death unique to 
humans. . . .  
 . . . . 
. . . Clearly, death is not a self-evident phenomenon.  The margins 
between life and death are socially and culturally constructed, mobile, 
multiple, and open to dispute and reformulation. 
MARGARET LOCK, TWICE DEAD:  ORGAN TRANSPLANTS AND THE REINVENTION OF DEATH 7, 
11 (2002).  Similarly, Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, another medical anthropologist comparing 
brain death and organ transplantation in North America and Japan, maintains that “death 
is always culturally defined even though it may be expressed in biological terms.”  Emiko 
Ohnuki-Tierney, Brain Death and Organ Transplantation:  Cultural Bases of Medical Technology, 
35 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 233, 235 (1994).  And for Turner, a medical sociologist, 
[t]here is a sense in which we can regard dying as the final process of 
aging.  Sociologists occasionally suggest that we can distinguish three 
forms of dying, namely psychological, sociological[,] and biological 
dying.  As we grow old we are gradually marginalized within the 
community and begin to lose a number of personal contacts, which 
takes the form of a personal or psychological contraction (dying) from 
social relations.  Through the process of dying our social contacts are 
gradually diminished and we find ourselves socially isolated.  Finally, 
this process is terminated by a biological death which brings to a 
conclusion the long history of our personal disengagement.  We can 
therefore regard dying like aging as a gradual attrition of social 
relations combined with increasing dependency often on institutions 
which are somewhat anonymous and bureaucratic.   
BRYAN S. TURNER, MEDICAL POWER AND SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE 125 (2d ed. 1995). 
For additional support for the proposition that death exists as both a biological fact 
and cultural construct, see Stanley L. Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality in 
the Assessment of Competence for Execution:  A Response to Bonnie, 14(1) LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
91, 94–95 (1990) [hereinafter Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality] 
(explaining that “some individuals view death as a brief sleep, after which they promptly 
return, memories intact.  Some view death as a time during which they leave their bodies 
after which their astral selves will watch their friends with physical bodies. . . .  These 
perspectives emphasize the importance of evaluating how a condemned man’s view of 
death influences his choice to be executed.”); STANLEY L. BRODSKY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND WELL-BEING 252–53 (1988) [hereinafter BRODSKY, PSYCHOLOGY OF 
ADJUSTMENT AND WELL-BEING].  Brodsky stated,  
One more answer can be given to the question of why death 
should be awaited with peaceful acceptance by some and with fierce 
despair by others.  It is because death has so many different meanings.  
To some, death is a trigger, a stimulus that produces predictable 
responses.  Death may be understood as an event, a process that may be 
a dramatic display or the quiet eye closing of beautiful actresses in 
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In fact, it is partly because the intent of volunteers is so difficult to 
discern that the issue has been so contentious.16  Some individuals 
support an inmate’s right to personal autonomy and would permit 
waiver or withdrawal of appeals provided that the courts are certain that 
the inmate is neither depressed nor suicidal, nor in fact innocent or 
legally ineligible for the death penalty.  Thus, these proponents would 
allow waiver or withdrawal of appeals by competent prisoners based on 
procedural claims, such as ineffective assistance of counsel, improperly 
excluded jurors, and prosecutorial misconduct.17  Others contend that 
the debate should surround not the nature of the appeals, but the motive 
of the competent inmate, whereby authentic acceptance of responsibility 
is treated differently than a mere desire to escape the grueling conditions 
of death row.18  Still, others argue that regardless of the nature of the 
appeal or the motive of the inmate, a condemned inmate’s decision to 
waive or withdraw his appeal should not be honored because the State’s 
interests in preserving life, safeguarding the integrity of the proceedings 
and the legal profession, and protecting the interests of the inmate’s 
                                                                                                             
movies.  How the state of death is approached affects the actual process 
of dying. 
Id.; ARTHUR KLEINMAN, THE ILLNESS NARRATIVES:  SUFFERING, HEALING AND THE HUMAN 
CONDITION 154 (1988) (discussing how each individual “must work out an appropriate and 
desired way toward death” in contrast to the “mechanical models of the stages of dying”). 
For a recent (counterintuitive) study finding that people become happier, rather than 
distressed, when contemplating their own death, see G. Nathan DeWall & Roy F. 
Baumeister, From Terror to Joy:  Automatic Turning to Positive Affective Information Following 
Mortality Salience, 18(11) PSYCHOL. SCI. 984, 984–90 (2007). 
For a recent overview of how different cultures and societies regard suicide, see 
Suicide:  Elusive, but Not Always Unstoppable, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2007, at 63–64.  See also 
Benedict Carey, Making Sense of the Great Suicide Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2008, at WK1, 
WK8.  Carey states,  
An expression of true love or raw hatred, of purest faith or mortal sin, of 
courageous loyalty or selfish cowardice:  The act of suicide has meant 
many things to many people through history, from the fifth-century 
Christian martyrs to the Samurais’ hara-kiri to more recent literary 
divas, Hemingway, Plath, Sexton. 
 . . . . 
. . . Suicide is an intimate, often impulsive decision that has defied 
scientific understanding, just as it has confounded easy explanation 
throughout history, or in literature. 
Id. at WK1. 
16 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Another Kind of Appeal From Death Row:  Kill Me, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 14, 2007, at A14. 
17 See infra Part III & IV.  See also Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1390–91; Liptak, supra note 16, 
at A14. 
18 See infra Part III & IV.  See also Stephen Blank, Killing Time:  The Process of Waiving 
Appeal the Michael Ross Death Penalty Cases, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 735, 735–77 (2006); Liptak, supra 
note 16, at A14. 
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family far outweigh the inmate’s right to personal autonomy.19  And 
finally, some claim that “competent” waiver or withdrawal is impossible 
and that the expressed desire to forego appeals is an indication of the 
inmate’s depression or suicidal ideation.20   
Scholars and commentators have considered such issues as the legal 
standard for waiver and withdrawal21 and the dilemmas it poses for 
defense lawyers22 and mental health professionals (forensic clinicians);23 
the nature of the claim the condemned wishes to waive or withdraw (i.e., 
substantive vs. procedural);24 the stage of the criminal justice process in 
which the individual expresses a preference for a death sentence (i.e., at 
trial vs. on appeal);25 and who may further appeal on behalf of an 
incompetent prisoner (known as “next friend standing”).26  This Article 
takes a different tack, building on Fair Fare?:  Food as Contested Terrain in 
U.S. Prisons and Jails, where this author used practices in prison as a lens 
                                                 
19 See infra Part III & IV.  See also Strafer, supra note 12, at  895–908; White, supra note 11, 
at  859. 
20 See infra Part III & IV.  See also Blank, supra note 18, at 764; Richard C. Dieter, Ethical 
Choices for Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 799–820 
(1990); Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 849–881. 
21 See, e.g., Blank, supra note 18, at 735–77; Bonnie, supra note 12, at 1185–88; Harrington, 
Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1109–51; Strafer, supra 
note 12, at 860, 876, 887. 
22 Richard J. Bonnie, Dilemmas in Administering the Death Penalty:  Conscientious 
Abstention, Professional Ethics, and the Needs of the Legal System, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 67, 
68–75 (Feb. 1990); Davis, supra note 15, at 45–47; Dieter, supra note 20, at 799–820; 
Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 849–881; Harrington, Mental Competence 
and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1111; White, supra note 11, at 859–60. 
According to Harrington, “[d]eath row volunteering . . . heightens the disjuncture 
between the competing obligations of defense counsel to respect client autonomy and 
protect client interests[;]” while “[v]olunteering raises similar ethical questions at all phases 
of litigation but resolving them becomes more difficult with each progressive phase [and as 
other issues are considered].”  Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 855, 856, 
868. 
23 Compare Bonnie, supra note 22, at 75–90 (criticizing the arguments for abstention from 
the capital sentencing process by mental health professionals), and Richard J. Bonnie, 
Grounds for Professional Abstention in Capital Cases:  A Reply to Brodsky, 14 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 99, 99–102 (1990), with Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra 
note 15, at 91–97. 
24 Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1377–79. 
25 Id. at 1389 (“If the trial court determines, after a suitable hearing, that the recalcitrant 
defendant has expressed a rational and stable preference for a death sentence, the attorney 
should be directed to comply with the defendant’s wishes regarding the presentation of 
mitigating evidence.”). 
26 See, e.g., Blank, supra note 18, at 767–70; Paul F. Brown, Third Party Standing—“Next 
Friends” as Enemies:  Third Party Petitions for Capital Defendants Wishing to Waive Appeal, 81 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 981, 981–1001 (1991); Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the 
Death House:  Third-Party Standing in Death-Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 201, 201–41 
(1994). 
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with which to examine prison power nexuses and to challenge 
conceptions of power relations in prison as simple, static, and 
unidirectional.27  In this Article, waiver and withdrawal of death penalty 
appeals serve as the domain through which meanings, identities, and 
relations are defined and contested, and this Article attempts to set forth 
a conceptual framework with which to understand these power 
dynamics.  Again relying on Wolf’s observation that “power balances 
always shift and change, its work is never done; [and] it operates against 
entropy[,]”28 the author of this Article argues, as he did in Fair Fare, that 
power relations between the State and the condemned are not 
unambiguous, straightforward, and imbalanced affairs.  This Article 
attempts to further an understanding of prison power relations in a 
qualitatively and quantitatively different context29—for, after all, “the 
penalty of death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed 
under our system of criminal justice.”30 
Part II of this Article briefly sketches some general characteristics of 
death row inmates and provides an overview of the conditions of death 
row confinement, including the impact of this environment on the 
emotional, mental, physical, and psychological health of the condemned 
prisoner. 
With this foundation, Part III turns to a consideration of reasons 
proffered for volunteering, ranging from guilt and remorse to 
perceptions of justice and fairness to avoidance of death row conditions 
to depression and suicidal urges to macho and hypermasculine notions 
of pain and death.  In so doing, Part III fleshes out the legal standard for 
the waiver or withdrawal of death penalty appeals and contemplates the 
argument that competent waiver is impossible in light of the experience 
of death row conditions of confinement (a theory known as “Death Row 
Syndrome” or “Death Row Phenomenon”), as well as the contentions 
that waiver or withdrawal upholds the dignity and autonomy of the 
prisoner. 
                                                 
27 Avi Brisman, Fair Fare?:  Food as Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 15(1) GEO. J. 
POVERTY L. & POL’Y 49, 49–93 (2008). 
28 Eric R. Wolf, Distinguished Lecture:  Facing Power, 92 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 586, 590 
(1990). 
29 Recognizing, of course, that “power is a notoriously difficult, and highly contested, 
variable (effect? intention?) to isolate for purposes of either social or ethnographic 
analysis[.]”  Mark Goodale, The Power of Right(s):  Tracking Empires of Law and New Modes of 
Social Resistance in Bolivia (and Elsewhere), in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  TRACKING 
LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 130, 146 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry, 
Eds., 2007).  
30 Gregg v. Georgia,  428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion).  See also McClellan, supra 
note 26, at 241; White, supra note 11, at 863, 865. 
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Part IV offers an analysis of waiver and withdrawal in light of 
Foucauldian notions of discipline and bio-power, as well as Hardt and 
Negri’s conception of the suicide bomber as an “opposite” of bio-
power.31  This Part considers the intent of the volunteer and the interests 
of the State, and classifies the volunteer as either a “docile body” or a 
“rebellious spirit” depending on his motivation(s) for waiver or 
withdrawal and his “use” (or lack thereof) to the State.  While Part IV 
presents the options quite starkly—as if the only choices available are 
“docile bodies” or “rebellious spirits”—the author of this Article does 
not dismiss the possibility of a continuum.  Rather, the goal is simply to 
help address the larger question of who ultimately controls the body of 
the condemned and to offer an instrument for exploring and 
contemplating the continued rationale for the death penalty and the 
purpose it may serve as a social phenomenon. 
Part V of this Article by presents directions for future research in 
light of Baze, the role of punishment in social life, and Foucauldian 
notions of punishment and spectacle. 
II.  CHARACTERISTICS OF DEATH ROW INMATES 
AND CONDITIONS ON DEATH ROW 
Death row inmates in the United States are predominantly male 
(approximately 98.5%) and disproportionately Southern.32  More than 
half are non-White—a percentage that far exceeds the racial composition 
of the United States as a whole.33  Many suffer from neurological 
abnormalities and neuropsychological deficiencies,34 as well as 
psychological disorders.35  According to Cunningham and Vigen, 
“[d]eath row inmates appear to have a disproportionate rate of serious 
psychological disorders relative to a general prison population . . . . 
ranging from maladaptive defenses to pervasive depression, mood 
                                                 
31 MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, MULTITUDE:  WAR AND DEMOCRACY IN THE AGE 
OF EMPIRE 44–45 (2004). 
32 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 194, 206.  See also Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty 
for Female Offenders, January 1, 1973, Through June 30, 2007 (2007), 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/FemDeathJune2007.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). 
33 See Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 195–96, 206 (comparing the percentage of 
African-Americans in the U.S. population as a whole—12.3%—to the percentage of 
African-Americans on death row 42.72%); Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death 
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 
2007).  For a discussion of whether this comparison is meaningful, see Reuben M. 
Greenberg, Race, the Criminal Justice System, and Community-Oriented Policing, 20 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 397, 397–404 (1997). 
34 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 201, 206. 
35 Id. at 200. 
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lability, and diminished mental acuity to episodic and chronic 
psychosis.”36  In addition, those convicted of capital offenses frequently 
have dysfunctional family histories (e.g., parental abuse, neglect, 
abandonment, foster care, and parental substance abuse),37 and a 
sizeable percentage report personal histories of substance 
abuse/dependence,38 including alcohol and/or drug use at the time of 
their crimes.39  As Burr expounds: 
The defendant is typically limited in his or her ability to 
live a productive, independent, law-abiding life.  These 
limits are imposed by a combination of problems:  
mental illness, organic brain damage, mental 
retardation, fetal alcohol syndrome, years of unrelenting 
battering and abuse at the hand of parents or adult 
caretakers, drug and alcohol dependence or, most 
commonly, some combination of these disabilities.  
When a violent crime is committed by a person who has 
one or more of these disabilities, the disabilities have 
necessarily contributed to that crime:  through 
impairment of the ability to recognize or make 
appropriate judgments about stressful situations and 
about socially unacceptable behavior; through an 
increased vulnerability to acting on the very strong 
impulses that all of us have, but that most of us have a 
way to modulate; through a diminished ability to 
recognize the harmful effects of one’s behavior on other 
people—to empathize; through a tendency to 
misperceive situations as threatening or hostile when 
they are really not; and finally, through a kind of 
reflexive and almost unconscious resort to violence as a 
way of coping with stress.40 
With respect to intellectual ability and educational achievement, 
although there are some instances of highly intelligent condemned 
prisoners,41 most death row inmates have not graduated from high 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 202, 206. 
38 Id. at 201, 206. 
39 Id.  
40 Richard H. Burr, Representing the Client on Death Row:  The Politics of Advocacy, 59 
UMKC L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
41 For example, the first modern capital punishment case (1924) to receive a large 
amount of media attention involved Nathaniel Leopold, 19, and Richard Loeb, 18, who 
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school and possess IQs in the low-average-to-average range.42  
Functional literacy levels of those on death row are frequently well 
below what would be expected from the amount of schooling these 
prisoners report receiving.43  Many border on mental retardation.44  As 
such, Cunningham and Vigen assert that “the intellectual, literacy, and 
psychological deficits of most death row inmates render them incapable 
of responding to the demands of direct appeals or postconviction 
proceedings without the assistance and representation of qualified legal 
counsel.”45  This leads them to conclude the following: 
[I]t is disturbing that so many inmates on death row are 
so obviously damaged—developmentally, intellectually, 
educationally, neurologically, and psychologically.  To 
the extent that the death penalty is intended to punish 
those murderers who are most morally culpable, there 
would seem to be some miscarriage of that intent when 
it is visited upon individuals who are manifestly 
damaged, deficient, or disturbed in their psychological 
development and functioning.46 
Such developmental, intellectual, educational, neurological, and 
psychological limitations may be exacerbated by the particular adverse 
conditions of death row incarceration.47  While variation in death row 
                                                                                                             
were convicted of the murder of Jacob Franks.  KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 26.  Leopold, a law 
student at the University of Chicago at the time of the crime, had an IQ over 200.  Id.  Loeb 
was the youngest graduate ever of the University of Michigan and had an IQ over 160.  Id.  
Similarly, the serial killer, Ted Bundy, graduated with honors from the University of 
Washington and briefly attended law school before devoting himself full-time to his 
criminal career.  Id. at 36–37. 
42 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 199, 206.  See generally R.J. Hernstein, 
Criminogenic Traits, in CRIME 39, 49–53 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995) 
(discussing the psychology of criminal behavior and the intelligence of offenders as a 
whole and noting that “[a]fter sex and age, the single most firmly established psychological 
fact about the population of offenders is that the distribution of their IQ scores differs from 
that of the population at large.  Instead of averaging 100, as the general population does, 
offenders average about eight points lower.”). 
43 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 199–200, 202, 206. 
44 Id. at 206.  Note, however, that in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme 
Court held that the execution of persons with mental retardation is cruel and unusual 
punishment and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 
45  Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 206.  See also id. at 202. 
46 Id. at 207. 
47 Id. at 206.  Note that unless an inmate is subjected to examination and evaluation prior 
to confinement, it may be difficult to discern which symptoms and illnesses an individual 
already has and which ones have been caused or exacerbated by death row conditions.  See 
generally TURNER, supra note 15, at 80 (stating that “[d]elusions and hallucinations[] . . . may 
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confinement conditions and policies exists from state to state,48 and while 
the experience of death row is unique to each individual,49 the death row 
setting is typically described as austere, barbaric, and draconian.50  
Inmates sentenced to death are frequently confined in separate areas of 
prisons (hence the term, “death row”)51 and experience few 
opportunities for exercise, rehabilitation, or even interaction with other 
inmates.52  As Brodsky explains:  “Living on death row is substantially 
different from living in the prison population in general. . . .  Death row 
inmates typically have restricted opportunities for work, education, 
recreation, visitation, worship, and friendships with other prisoners.”53  
Similarly, Lombardi and his colleagues have found the following:  
Capital punishment inmates were housed at a 
belowground unit at JCCC [the Jefferson City 
Correctional Center in Jefferson City, Missouri] 
completely segregated from the general inmate 
population.  With restrictions on movement and limited 
access to programs, conditions of confinement for death 
row inmates were similar to those found in other states.  
Death row inmates did not leave their housing unit.  All 
services, including medical, recreation, food, and legal 
materials, were brought to condemned prisoners.  
                                                                                                             
occur in a wide range of cultural and subcultural contexts and especially under stress and 
sensory deprivation . . . .”). 
48 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 194, 204.  See also Johnnie L. Gallemore, Jr. & 
James H. Panton, Inmate Response to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 527, 531 (1975).   
49 Gallemore & Panton, supra note 48, at 531 (stating that “the adjustment [to death row] 
seems to be unique for each individual and not entirely predictable on the basis of 
psychiatric diagnosis and previous behavior”). 
50 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 194 (noting the impact of “particularly 
draconian conditions of incarceration” on inmates); Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3 
(stating that “[f]rom early times, death row conditions were characterized by a pervasive 
emphasis on rigid security, isolation, limited movement, and austere conditions[]”); Strafer, 
supra note 12, at 869 (noting the “barbaric conditions pervading death rows and the 
debilitating and life-negating effects of these conditions”). 
51 Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3.  See also Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A11.  
Although according to one commentator, Texas’s death row is “hardly a row any more, but 
an entire compound[,]” given that 360 men and 9 women await execution.  Id. 
52 Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007) (explaining that during their 
years on death row, inmates “are generally isolated from other prisoners, excluded from 
prison educational and employment programs, and sharply restricted in terms of visitation 
and exercise, spending as much as 23 hours a day alone in their cells”). 
53 Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional, supra note 15, at 94. 
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Inmates were permitted 1 hour of outside exercise each 
day in a small, fenced area by the unit.54 
While violence and the threat of violence in prison is a persistent and 
pervasive problem contributing to inmate anxiety, depression, and 
stress,55 most death row inmates—even those in facilities where death-
sentenced prisoners are integrated into the general prison population—
do not behave violently.56  According to Cunningham and Vigen, 
most death row inmates are engaged in direct appeals or 
postconviction reviews of their death sentences, seeking 
sentence commutation or new trials.  As the outcome of 
subsequent petitions and litigation might be influenced 
by death row misconduct, inmates do have something to 
                                                 
54 Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 4.  See also Blank, supra note 18, at 753 (explaining how 
“[death row] inmates are generally isolated from other prisoners, excluded from prison 
educational and employment programs, and sharply restricted in terms of visitation and 
exercise, spending as many as twenty-three hours a day alone in their cells”); JAMES W. 
MARQUART, SHELDON EKLAND-OLSON, AND JONATHAN R. SORENSEN, THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, 
AND THE NEEDLE:  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923–1990 138 (1994) (describing a 
“dominance of security” on Texas’ death row, with twenty plus hours of cell confinement, 
meals in cells, strict custody procedures, and restraints on out-of-cell movement).  See also 
McClellan, supra note 26, at 213–14 (describing the “lonely lives” of inmates on death row, 
who usually do not mingle with the general population, spend most of their hours “‘locked 
down[,]’” frequently eat their meals alone in their cells, and receive little exercise or 
rehabilitation); Strafer, supra note 12, at 869–70 (describing how “death row inmates are 
generally not integrated into the general prison population; have no access to 
‘rehabilitative’ programs; have little opportunity to exercise; and are confined to their cells 
for extraordinarily long periods of time”). 
55 See, e.g., Avi Brisman, Toward a More Elaborate Typology of Environmental Values:  
Liberalizing Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws and Policies, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 283, 303–05 (2007). For a comparison between levels of violence in American 
and Japanese prisons, see Norimitsu Onishi, As Japan Ages, Prisons Adapt to Going Gray, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, at A1. 
56 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 203 (“An expectation then that death row 
inmates will invariably commit assaults in prison because they have ‘nothing to lose’ 
appears to be unfounded. . . .  [T]he majority of death row inmates do not exhibit serious 
violence within the structured context of institutional confinement.”).  See also id. at 207; 
Tad Friend, Dean of Death Row:  The Man Who Became the Face of San Quentin, THE NEW 
YORKER, July 30, 2007, at 62, 68; Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 7 (finding that “[t]he 
majority of capital offenders are more easily managed with integration.  Before the 
integration program, [condemned] inmates had little to lose—outside of limited program 
activities—for noncompliance with facility regulations.”); MARQUART ET AL., supra note 54, 
at 181 (noting that most prisoners awaiting execution serve their time without major 
incident). 
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lose should they exhibit a pattern of recurrent 
institutional violence.57 
Nevertheless, many inmates experience death row as a “living 
death”58 in large part because of the lengthy amount of time they spend 
awaiting execution.59 
To illustrate, consider Robert–François Damiens, the failed regicide, 
whose gruesome execution is described in lurid detail by Michel 
Foucault at the beginning of Discipline and Punish:  The Birth of the Prison.  
Damiens’s unsuccessful assassination attempt of Louix XV of France 
occurred on January 5, 1757; his execution took place just under two 
months later on March 2, 1757.60  Similarly, the Death Penalty 
Information Center explains that “[w]hen the [C]onstitution was written, 
the time between sentencing and execution could be measured in days or 
weeks.”61  In contrast, most death-sentenced inmates in the United States 
today “languish for periods best measured in years as they await final 
disposition of their cases in the appellate process.”62  Condemned 
prisoners frequently spend over a decade awaiting execution.63  For 
example, Cunningham and Vigen found that the eighty-five prisoners 
                                                 
57 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 32, at 203.  Cunningham and Vigen also explain that 
“[f]or some, the violent offense of conviction occurred in a particular context or at a 
developmental stage that is not replicated in prison.”  Id. 
58 R. JOHNSON, CONDEMNED TO DIE:  LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH 17 (1981) (emphasis 
omitted).  
59 See generally Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 9. 
Even where the conditions of death row are not so degrading as to 
violate general cruel and unusual punishment norms, or result in 
mental incompetency for execution, the very length of death row 
confinement has been raised as an issue.  Jurists have noted that 
lengthy death row confinement might result in cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
Id.  Cf. Adam Liptak, At 60% of Total, Texas Is Bucking Execution Trend, supra note 2, at A18 
(describing how “Texas courts . . . speed the process along”). 
60 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH:  THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 3 (Alan Sheridan, 
trans., 1977). 
61 Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo. 
org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007).  See generally Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 420 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that “in cases tried at 
common law[,] execution often followed fairly quickly after trial”). 
62 Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3. 
63 Blank, supra note 18, at 752–53.  See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on 
Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited 
Dec. 8, 2007). 
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executed in 2000 averaged 11.42 years between sentence and execution.64  
For some prisoners, their time on death row exceeds twenty years.65 
Part of the reason for the lag between sentence and execution (aside 
from the requirements of the exhaustion doctrine, whereby a state 
prisoner must exhaust all state judicial remedies to litigate federal claims 
before a federal court will hear a petition for writ of habeas corpus66) is 
that reforms intended to ensure the accuracy and thoroughness of 
convictions and sentences have taken increasingly more time.67  For the 
                                                 
64 Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 195. 
65 Blank, supra note 18, at 753.  See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death 
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 
2007).  Tad Friend explains in his article that 
[t]he public broadly endorses the [death] penalty—by about sixty-five 
per cent in most polls—but many capital cases are beset by doubt, 
mitigating circumstances, or evidence of the condemned’s remorse or 
redemption.  California has a particularly thorough appellate process, 
and the result, on death row at San Quentin, is agonizing stasis:  six 
hundred and twenty-nine men, the nation’s largest assembly of the 
condemned, now sit for an average of more than twenty-two years 
before their sentence is carried out. 
Friend, supra note 56, at 62, 68. 
 It is thus interesting to note that over the years, the amount of time that elapses 
between commission of the crime and execution has increased, while the amount of time it 
takes to execute an inmate has decreased.  It used to be that individuals, such as Damiens, 
see FOUCAULT, supra note 60, were tried quickly and the execution was prolonged.  Now, 
the final disposition takes years, but once the date of execution arrives, the goal is to kill the 
inmate as quickly as possible.  See Theo Emery, Tennessee, After Review, Sets Execution, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A19. 
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000).  Under the “total exhaustion” requirement of Rose v. 
Lundy, federal district courts must dismiss “mixed petitions”—petitions containing both 
unexhausted and exhausted claims—in their entirety.  455 U.S. 509, 520–22 (1982).  In the 
blunt words of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who authored the opinion for the Court, “our 
interpretation of §§ 2254(b), (c) provides a simple and clear instruction to potential litigants:  
before you bring any claims to federal court, be sure that you first have taken each one to 
state court.”  Id. at 520. 
 See also Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures of State Postconviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 359 (1988).  Before presenting federal claims to a federal court in a 
petition for habeas corpus, prisoners usually have to engage any state post conviction 
procedures available after their convictions are affirmed on direct state appellate review.  
Id. 
67 See Blank, supra note 18, at 752.  Blank explains, 
In the wake of the Supreme Court-mandated suspension of the death 
penalty from 1972 to 1976, numerous reforms have been introduced to 
create a less arbitrary system, arbitrary referring to ensuring that the 
process used to convict an inmate to death is accurate and thorough.  
This has resulted in lengthier appeals, as mandatory sentencing reviews 
have become the norm, and continual changes in laws and technology 
have necessitated reexamination of individual sentences. 
Id. (footnote omitted); Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007). 
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most part, such measures have been welcomed.68  But, these efforts 
geared towards rendering the criminal justice system less arbitrary have 
prolonged the experience of living on death row. 
Lombardi and his colleagues offer the following reminder:  “outside 
of occasional news stories about appeals, stays, or actual executions, little 
attention is paid to death row prisoners themselves.  Yet the capital 
punishment process also involves confinement—commonly for years—as 
inmates’ cases wind their way through the appellate system.”69  West 
paints a more poignant picture:  “Everyone must die, but only the 
condemned prisoner is subjected to the terrible agony of prolonged 
waiting—sometimes for years, tormented by hope—to be deliberately 
slaughtered by a self-righteous society, while others, no different, are 
allowed to live.  This torture is harsher than the thumbscrew and rack.”70  
But perhaps Blank offers the best assessment, suggesting that death-
sentenced inmates who spend so much time awaiting execution actually 
receive “two distinct punishments:  the death sentence itself, and the 
years of living in conditions tantamount to solitary confinement.”71 
Indeed, the prolonged anticipation of death in a (relatively) known 
manner at an uncertain time under the austere conditions described 
above may be considered one of the most stressful of all human 
experiences.72  As such, many death row inmates, especially those who 
                                                 
68 See Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007) 
(contending that “[d]eath-penalty proponents and opponents alike say such careful review 
is imperative when the stakes are life and death”). 
69 Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 3 (emphasis added). 
70 Louis Jolyon West, Psychiatric Reflections on the Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 419, 421–22 (Hugo Adam Bedau and Chester M. Pierce, eds., 1975).  
See generally Blumenthal, supra note 11, at A1, A11 (“Death is death[] . . . .  If they stick a 
needle in your arm or shoot you in the head, it’s cruel and inhuman punishment, taking a 
human life. . . .  [A] life sentence is a whole lot worse—it’s torture.” (quoting Jack Harry 
Smith, 70, the oldest death row inmate in Texas) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
71 Blank, supra note 18, at 753.  See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death 
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 
2007) (asking “whether death row prisoners are receiving two distinct punishments:  the 
death sentence itself, and the years of living in conditions tantamount to solitary 
confinement—a severe form of punishment that may be used only for very limited periods 
for general-population prisoners”). 
72 See In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890) (declaring that “when a prisoner sentenced 
by a court to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, 
one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected during that time is the 
uncertainty during the whole of it”); Coleman v. Balkom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (stating 
that “the deterrent value of incarceration during that period of uncertainty may well be 
comparable to the consequences of the ultimate step itself”) (Stevens, J., opinion respecting 
denial of cert.); Blank, supra note 18, at 752; Gallemore & Panton, supra note 48, at 527, 531; 
Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death:  The Psychology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAW & 
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enter prison with pre-existing (although not necessarily diagnosed) 
emotional and psychological illnesses, suffer feelings of defeat, fear, 
helplessness, lack of empathy and sympathy, loneliness, and 
vulnerability, as well as mood swings, recurrent depression, and a 
deterioration of mental and physical abilities, characterized by 
confusion, drowsiness, forgetfulness, lethargy, listlessness, and mental 
slowness.73  In this sense, the body of the criminal (as well as his mind 
                                                                                                             
PSYCHOL. REV. 141, 141–92 (1979).  See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on Death 
Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 
2007) (stating that “unlike general-population prisoners, even in solitary confinement, 
death-row inmates live in a state of constant uncertainty over when they will be executed.  
For some death row inmates, this isolation and anxiety results in a sharp deterioration in 
their mental status.”); Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death:  A Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 57 IOWA L. REV. 814, 830 (1972) (“The tremendous mental strain of inexorably 
approaching a foreordained death is unique to the condemned man.  The imposition of this 
strain violates society’s standard that a man should be treated with human dignity, and 
robs the condemned prisoner of his own human dignity and psychological integrity.”) 
(footnotes omitted); Strafer, supra note 12, at 867 (declaring that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a 
source of psychological stress more exacting than being forced to live the spasmodic 
certainty and uncertainty of being sentenced to die”); West, supra note 70, at 424 (stating 
that “[d]eath sentences create a grisly reservoir of condemned persons living under 
unbelievable stress in a situation . . . .[on] Death Row, organized and controlled in grim 
caricature of a laboratory, the condemned prisoner’s personality is subjected to incredible 
stress for prolonged periods of time”).  See generally Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421, 1421 
(1995) (“It is arguable that neither ground [retribution nor deterrence] retains any force for 
prisoners who have spent some 17 years under a sentence of death.”) (Stevens, J. opinion 
respecting denial of cert.); Elledge v. Florida, 119 S. Ct. 366, 367 (1998) (maintaining that 
“after such a delay [twenty-three years], an execution may well cease to serve the 
legitimate penological purposes that otherwise provide a necessary constitutional 
justification for the death penalty”) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Knight v. 
Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 461–62 (1999) (stating that “[w]here a delay, measured in decades, 
reflects the State’s own failure to comply with the Constitution’s demands, the claim that 
time has rendered the execution inhuman is a particularly strong one[,]” and contending 
that “[i]t is difficult to deny the suffering inherent in a prolonged wait for execution[]. . . .”) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.); Smith v. Arizona, 128 S. Ct. 466, 466 (2007) 
(“Smith can reasonably claim that his execution at this late date [thirty years after 
sentencing] would be ‘unusual.’  I am unaware of other executions that have taken place 
after so long a delay[.]”) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of cert.). 
73 See Blank, supra note 18, at 746 (stating that “living under sentence of death can cause 
an overwhelming sense of helplessness and fear”) (citing State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 593 
(2005)); Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 6, at 204 (“Not surprisingly, there is evidence that 
these bleak confinement conditions impact the psychological adjustment of death row 
inmates—most of whom spend many years in this status.”); Lombardi et al., supra note 6, at 
8 (“Overly oppressive physical conditions of death row may be detrimental to the inmate’s 
mental health . . . .”); West, supra note 70, at 425 (“The strain of existence on Death Row is 
very likely to produce behavioral aberrations ranging from malingering to acute psychotic 
breaks.”).  See also Blank, supra note 18, at 746 & n.61 (describing how “‘prisoners held in 
segregated confinement frequently develop mental disturbances’ . . . .includ[ing] impaired 
alertness, attention and concentration, hyperresponsiveness to stimuli, withdrawal, 
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and soul) is “slowly destroyed as part of the legal system of revenge.”74  
Contrary to Foucault’s contentions, the death sentence (albeit not the 
execution, per se) has very much retained “those long processes in which 
death [i]s both retarded by calculated interruptions and multiplied by a 
series of successive attacks.”75  
With this bleak backdrop, this Article now turns to a consideration of 
the reasons proffered by inmates and commentators for the waiver or 
withdrawal of death penalty appeals.  While an exhaustive review is 
outside the scope of this Article, Part III endeavors to provide a sufficient 
survey of motivations for volunteering, as well as arguments for and 
against allowing the waiver or withdrawal of appeals, in order to set the 
framework for the discussion in Part IV of what these positions reveal 
about the power dynamics between the State and the condemned 
prisoner. 
III.  PURPORTED REASONS FOR VOLUNTEERING AND WHETHER COURTS 
SHOULD PERMIT THE WAIVER OR WITHDRAWAL OF DEATH PENALTY 
APPEALS 
The general supposition in capital cases is that defendants wish to 
avoid the death penalty.76  Indeed, as Davis contends, “Our system of 
justice rests on two fundamental but rarely articulated assumptions.  
Those who are alive want to remain so.  When their interest in living is 
threatened[,] they will fight to remain alive.”77  But as noted above, many 
capital defendants, at various points in their criminal proceedings, 
express a preference for death to the alternative of life in prison78—a 
preference that, depending on the circumstances, may challenge State 
control of the inmate’s body79 and State attempts to manipulate the 
                                                                                                             
obsessive preoccupation with trivial matters, sleep disturbances and psychotic delirium”) 
(citing Ross, 272 Conn. at 593); Johnson, supra note 72, at 141–92. 
74 TURNER, supra note 15, at 34. 
75 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 12. 
76 White, supra note 11, at 853.  See generally DeWall, supra note 15, at 984 (stating that 
“[m]ost living things strive to continue living”); cf. McClellan, supra note 26, at 213 (stating 
that “[d]eath-row inmates may have understandable motivations to actively seek the 
imposition of presumably valid sentences”). 
77 Davis, supra note 15, at 45. 
78 See generally supra note 9 and accompanying text.  See Harrington, A Community 
Divided, supra note 11, at 861–62.  According to Harrington, the decision to volunteer is 
usually marked by some “precipitating factor . . . extraneous to the case[,]” such as “a 
friend or family member has stopped visiting, the food or noise in the prison has gotten 
particularly bad, relations between inmates have turned violent, and so forth.”  Id. 
79 See TURNER, supra note 15, at 17, 210.  See generally J. Anthony Paredes and Elizabeth D. 
Purdum, “Bye-bye Ted . . .”:  Community Response in Florida to the Execution of Theodore Bundy, 
6 ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY 9–11 (1990) (describing how “the governor [of Florida] and [Ted] 
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meaning of death and suicide (or at least the conditions under which 
death occurs).80 
                                                                                                             
Bundy seemed locked together as mythic combatants” over whether and when Bundy 
would die). 
Because most defense attorneys will not accede to their clients’ requests to waive or 
withdraw death penalty appeals, one could make the argument that the struggle for control 
of the inmate’s body involves three players, rather than two—the State, the inmate, and the 
defense attorney.  See generally White, supra note 11, at 859–60 (describing efforts taken by 
defense lawyers to circumvent inmates’ requests to “volunteer”). 
80 See generally infra Part IV.  See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY:  
AN INTRODUCTION, VOL. I 135–36, 139–40 (Robert Hurley, trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978) 
(illustrating how “[f]or a long time, one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power 
was the right to decide life and death. . . .  The sovereign exercised his right of life only by 
exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing[,]” but that starting in the 
Seventeenth century, “[t]he old power of death that symbolized sovereign power was now 
carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies and the calculated management of 
life.”); HARDT & NEGRI, supra, note 31, at 20 (“Sovereign political power can never really 
arrive at the pure production of death because it cannot afford to eliminate the life of its 
subjects.”); LOCK, supra note 15, at 195 (suggesting that the “[s]udden and uncontrolled 
death, and particularly accidental and violent death, death in childbirth, and suicide, raise 
concerns about the condition of the social order”); TURNER, supra note 15, at 210 (describing 
how 
[w]ith technological change in the production and termination of life 
processes, the state has become increasingly involved in the legal 
dispute over the character of life—its origins, shape and destiny.  To 
some extent these conflicts raise at an acute political level the features 
of modern patriarchy, since the state is now involved in the technical, 
political and ideological battle over women’s bodies. 
). 
 For French sociologist Emile Durkheim, who wrote the first case study of suicide, 
suicide rates were a reflection of the state of a community or society.  Rapidly increasing 
rates of suicide were, according to Durkheim, symptomatic of the breakdown of the 
collective conscience and social control.  EMILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE:  A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 
14–17 (John A. Spauling & George Simpson, trans., 1955) (1897); cf. JACK D. DOUGLAS, THE 
SOCIAL MEANINGS OF SUICIDE 103–08 (1967).  Following Durkheim, states thus have a 
vested interest in the attitudes, meanings, perceptions, and rates of suicide.  See generally 
TURNER, supra note 15, at 179 (noting that “the state must attempt to preserve and promote 
the general conditions of social harmony”). 
For perspectives on the relationship of the State in Japan to the meaning of suicide, see 
Chikako Ozawa-de Silva, Too Lonely to Die Alone:  Internet Suicide Pacts and Existential 
Suffering in Japan (under review with CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY) (referring to Japan as a 
“‘suicide nation’ . . . due to the various forms of suicide that have gained prominence in 
public attention,” describing the “popular Japanese discourse that suicide is one way that 
individuals can assert their autonomy in a collectivist Japanese society,” claiming that 
“[t]here has been a strong tendency in Japanese thought on suicide to blame society itself 
and to look outside the actual individuals for the cause of suicide,” and explaining that 
“[i]n Japan . . . certain suicides are given a positive cultural valence . . . . suicide is culturally 
acceptable only under certain circumstances—when there is a clear reason for the person to 
commit suicide according to cultural norms”) (manuscript on file with author); MAURICE 
PINGUET, VOLUNTARY DEATH IN JAPAN 2–3 (1993) (explaining that “the essential point is 
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A death row inmate may volunteer for execution for any number of 
reasons.  Some possess persistent guilt and sorrow about the crime or 
crimes they committed.81  As Davis explains, “there are those who have a 
profound, overpowering sense of guilt for what they have done, and for 
them, their execution is the only way to not only expiate their sins but to 
relieve them from the excruciating pain they are enduring.”82  Others 
with even more guilt and an even more extreme need for expiation 
“view death as the entrance into an eternity of torture, justly deserved 
for their true sins.”83  In less radical ways, many express feelings of 
“remorse” and stress the importance of “justice.” 
For example, in Comer v. Stewart,84 the inmate explained that his 
decision to withdraw his appeal grew out of a lengthy process of 
introspection whereby he came to regret his actions, to recognize the 
hurt he had caused many people in his life, and to accept and participate 
in the punishment justice demanded for his crime.85  Acknowledging a 
debt to the friends and family of his victim, as well as a desire to spare 
his own family and friends ongoing pain, Comer declared:  “I started 
thinking about my victims, thinking about everything.  It’s just time to 
end it now. . . .  I’ve been saying for a year—for, you know, the last 
couple of years, at least, I killed this guy. . . .  I stuck a gun in the guy’s 
ear, pulled the trigger.”86  Comer did not express a true desire to die, nor 
did he indicate support for the death penalty in general as a form of 
punishment.  But in his arguments to the district court, he indicated that 
he wished to waive his appeals and expedite his death sentence because 
he accepted the finality of his punishment87—reasons that the district 
court found persuasive.88   
                                                                                                             
that in Japan, there was never any objection in principle to the free choice of death—a 
question on which Western ideology has always found it difficult to pronounce”). 
81 Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850. 
82 Davis, supra note 15, at 46.  See also Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 
850. 
83 Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra note 15, at 94. 
84 Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2002). 
85 Id. at 1063. 
86 Id. at 1063, 1062 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See generally Harrington, A 
Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850. 
87 Comer, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1061–72; Blank, supra 18, at 750–51. 
88 Comer, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.  On appeal, a divided three-judge panel for the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s determination 
that Comer had made a “free and deliberate choice” to die, but found that Comer’s 
Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated and held that Comer was entitled to a 
new sentencing hearing.  Comer v. Schirro, 463 F.3d 934, 948, 964–65 (9th Cir. 2006).  See 
also Liptak, supra note 16, at A14.  The Ninth Circuit then agreed to hear the case en banc, 
Comer v. Stewart, 471 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 2006), and on rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit 
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In contrast, the death row inmate in Hamblen v. State expressed no 
reservations about capital punishment as a matter of course.89  But like 
Comer, Hamblen agreed with its imposition in his own case.90  Going 
one step further than Comer, Hamblen, like other condemned prisoners 
pressing for waiver or withdrawal, revealed that he did not want to 
grow old in prison and no longer wished to live.91  In response to 
Hamblen’s probation officer’s recommendation of life imprisonment 
without hope of parole in order to provide the opportunity for reflection 
upon the senselessness of his crime, Hamblen stated: 
Mr. Chance [the probation officer] might have a valid 
point if I were a young man with a whole lifetime ahead 
of me and with a whole pocketful of hopes and 
                                                                                                             
held that Comer’s pro se motion to waive further proceedings on habeas petition was 
voluntary and valid.  Comer, 480 F.3d at 960. 
In reflecting on Comer’s case, it is worth considering the work of two anthropologists 
working in Japan.  In her observations about the effect of the Japanese psychotherapeutic 
method of Naikan on its practitioners, Chikako Ozawa-de Silva writes that Naikan permits 
one to engage in 
a life-review enabl[ing] one to reflect on what kind of person one was in 
life, and what one should have or could have done in the past; it is a 
serious self-examination, which most people will have at one point in 
their life. . . .  Naikan is thus a preliminary facing of death, and, if done 
deeply enough, actually eventuates an experience of fundamental 
renewal, described by clients and practitioners as “rebirth.” 
CHIKAKO OZAWA-DE SILVA, PSYCHOTHERAPY AND RELIGION IN JAPAN:  THE JAPANESE 
INTROSPECTION PRACTICE OF NAIKAN 27 (2006).  Comer’s process of introspection, like that 
of the Naikan practitioner, may have permitted him to comprehend his mistakes and 
crimes.  But with no opportunity to live differently (for had he not been executed, he still 
would have spent his life in prison) and no occasion to make positive contributions as a 
result of his new self-understanding and self-awareness, he was unable to feel renewal and 
rebirth, leaving death as the only option. 
Similarly, Dorinne K. Kondo, in her examination of the Rinri (Ethics) movement in 
Japan and the creation of “ethics centers” (also referred to as “ethics retreats” or “ethics 
schools”), explains that the purpose of such centers is to create “disciplined selves”—selves 
possessing “sensitivity to social context and to the demands of social roles—not dogged 
adherence to an ‘authentic,’ inner self to which one must be true, regardless of the situation 
or the consequences for others.”  DORINNE K. KONDO, CRAFTING SELVES:  POWER, GENDER, 
AND DISCOURSES OF IDENTITY IN A JAPANESE WORKPLACE 107–08 (1990).  Comer’s extensive 
self-reflection, combined with the austerity of prison, may have permitted him to transform 
his “self,” much like the attendees of the ethics schools.  But with no opportunity to build 
on this transformation—with no opportunity to live differently, the way that ethics school 
participants use their ethics experiences to “carry[] out [their] prescribed roles as dutiful 
sons and daughters and as loyal, diligent workers.”  Id. at 113.  Comer may have felt that 
death was the only real choice. 
89 527 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1988). 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  See also Davis, supra note, 15, at 46; Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 
11, at 850; White, supra note 11, at 861. 
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dreams. . . .   But, as a matter of fact, I’m 55, almost 56 
years old and I don’t harbor any dreams that are going 
to be realized in this world, and I am not particularly 
given to reflection.  Therefore, it seems to me that Mr. 
Chance’s recommendation in this instance is 
inappropriate and [the prosecutor] Mr. Bledsoe’s, on the 
other hand, is appropriate.92 
The trial judge considered Hamblen’s preference, reviewed the 
record, including the psychological reports, and sentenced Hamblen to 
death.93  The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and sentence 
of death.94 
Situations such as Comer’s and Hamblen’s present challenges to 
courts, attorneys, and mental health professionals who must assess the 
competency and voluntariness of waiver/withdrawal.  The standard 
used to determine whether an individual is competent to waive or 
withdraw his death penalty appeals and forego any further legal 
proceedings was first set forth in Rees v. Peyton.95  In Rees, the Supreme 
Court indicated that courts must evaluate “whether [the prisoner] has 
[the] capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with 
respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other 
hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect 
which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises.”96  Since 
Rees, some courts considering the issue of competence with respect to a 
would-be volunteer have broken down the Rees standard into a series of 
questions.  For example, in Rumbaugh v. Procunier,97 the Fifth Circuit 
interpreted the Rees test to require a death-eligible defendant to answer 
the following: 
 
(1) Is the person suffering from a mental disease or defect? 
                                                 
92 Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 802 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also Davis, supra 
note 15, at 46. 
93 Hamblen, 527 So. 2d at 802.  A trial judge made this determination because Hamblen 
had waived his right to have a jury consider whether he should be executed.  Id. at 801.  
Hamblen did not appeal his sentence, but the public defender’s office was appointed as 
appellate counsel for Hamblen.  Id. at 802.  Hamblen moved to withdraw the appeal, but 
his motion was denied.  Id. 
94 Id. at 805.  See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/searchable-database-executions (last visited Nov. 28, 
2007).  Hamblen was electrocuted on September 21, 1990.  Id. 
95  384 U.S. 312 (1966). 
96 Id. at 314.  See also Blank, supra note 18, at 738, 764–67; Harrington, Mental Competence 
and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1113; McClellan, supra note 26, at 232. 
97 753 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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(2) If the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect, does 
that disease or defect prevent him from understanding his legal 
position and the options available to him? 
(3) If the person is suffering from a mental disease or defect which 
does not prevent him from understanding his legal position and 
the options available to him, does that disease or defect, 
nevertheless, prevent him from making a rational choice among 
his options?98 
 
The Fifth Circuit continued: 
If the answer to the first question is no, the court need go 
no further, the person is competent.  If both the first and 
second questions are answered in the affirmative, the 
person is incompetent and the third question need not 
be addressed.  If the first question is answered yes and 
the second is answered no, the third question is 
determinative; if yes, the person is incompetent, if no, 
the person is competent.99 
While some courts rely on “the actual Rees formulation,” rather than 
breaking down the Rees standard into three questions,100 the point is that 
a condemned prisoner may not waive or withdraw his appeals or 
otherwise terminate his legal proceedings without a sufficient hearing to 
ascertain his ability to make such a choice rationally.  Despite this 
safeguard,101 determining whether a death row inmate possesses the 
                                                 
98  Id. at 398.  The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a similar approach.  See Lonchar v. Zant, 
978 F.2d 637, 641–42 (11th Cir. 1992); Hauser ex rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316, 1322 
(11th Cir. 2000).   
For a brief overview of Rees and Rumbaugh, see Harrington, Mental Competence and 
End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1113 n.5 and accompanying text; McClellan, 
supra note 26, at 232–33; see also Strafer, supra note 12, at 876.  
99  Rumbaugh, 753. F.2d at 398–99. 
100 Dennis ex rel. Butko v. Budge, 378 F.3d 880, 888 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004). 
101 According to some commentators, the Rees standard and permutations thereof are 
inadequate.  See, e.g., Blank, supra note 18, at 766, 770; Strafer, supra note 12, at 860–912.  
One commentator claims: 
The Rees test for competency[] . . . is unclear and subject to differing 
interpretations. . . .  The Rees test requires that the court find either that 
the defendant lacks appreciation of defendant’s position and is unable 
to make rational choices or that the defendant suffers from a mental 
disease, disorder, or defect affecting capacity.  Therefore, under Rees, if a 
defendant suffers from a mental illness but makes seemingly rational 
choices, the court still should find the defendant incompetent.  In 
contrast, under the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation[,] . . . the court could 
find the same defendant competent. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/1
2009] Death Penalty Appeals 483 
requisite competency is extremely difficult when the prisoner expresses a 
desire to volunteer for execution because he can no longer tolerate the 
dehumanizing conditions of most death row facilities, as described 
above102 and as seen in the example of Hamblen, or experiences severe 
depression or possesses pre-existing suicidal urges103 that nonetheless do 
not prevent his “understanding his legal position and the options 
available to him[.]”104  Establishing whether a prisoner has made a 
knowing and intelligent waiver or withdrawal of his death penalty 
appeals may prove particularly vexing when the prisoner expresses a 
wish “to escape the roller-coaster experience of the habeas appeals 
process or to seize control over it[,]”105 or indicates a desire for a “macho 
confrontation with death.”106  While this latter proffered reason for 
volunteering—the wish for a macho confrontation with death also 
known as “the ‘blaze of glory’ syndrome”107—may seem odd and 
unusual, Brodsky notes that “[t]hese beliefs are not rare; a small but 
visible minority of condemned men hold them.”108  In fact, Gary Mark 
Gilmore, noted above and discussed again in Part IV—the first 
individual executed in the United States following the reinstatement of 
                                                                                                             
McClellan, supra note 26, at 233 (footnotes omitted). 
102 See supra Part II.  See also Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850; 
Strafer, supra note 12, at 873.  Strafer argues that:  
In a sense, the condemned have at their disposal an “easier” way to find 
release from unbearable conditions [than dying patients]:  they can 
simply “pull the plug” by firing their attorneys and withdrawing their 
appeals.  Robert Lee Massie, for example, attempted to dismiss his 
automatic appeal from a first degree murder conviction in California in 
1979 primarily because he preferred execution to the extended torture of 
life on San Quentin’s death row. 
Strafer, supra note 102, at 873 (citing Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1103 (1981)). 
103 Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850. 
104 See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
105 Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850.  See also Blank, supra note 18, 
at 746 (explaining that “living under sentence of death can cause an overwhelming sense of 
helplessness and fear resulting in a desperate need to regain control by waiving further 
challenges to the death sentence”). 
106 Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 850 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra note 15, at 93 
(discussing the hypothetical prisoner whose “primary underlying motive [for withdrawal 
of appeals] is a deep commitment to toughness, to hypermasculine, adolescent beliefs that 
the worth of a man lies in his tolerance of pain.”); Harrington, Mental Competence and End-
of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1133 (noting that some inmate’s “don’t want to be 
perceived as wishy-washy or weak or cowardly” and that they want newspapers to report 
“‘[i]nmate goes bravely to his death[]’”). 
107 Strafer, supra note 12, at 875 n.56.  See also McClellan, supra note 26, at 214-15. 
108 Brodsky, Professional Ethics and Professional Morality, supra note 15, at 93.  See also 
McClellan, supra note 26, at 209; White, supra note 11, at 872. 
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the death penalty after Gregg v. Georgia lifted the four-year moratorium 
imposed by Furman v. Georgia in 1972109—was “intoxicated by the 
prospect of [his] own punishment” and relished the publicity associated 
with his volunteering and becoming the first person to be executed after 
reinstatement.110 
These reasons are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive:  a 
death row inmate may possess multiple motivations for wishing to 
waive or withdraw his appeals and may emphasize one over another 
depending on circumstances and the progress (or lack thereof) of his 
proceedings.  That a condemned prisoner’s grounds for volunteering 
may be protean, making it difficult to discern his intent and his 
competency,111 has led many people to argue that death row inmates 
should not be permitted to waive or withdraw their appeals. 
For example, although the United States Supreme Court has rejected 
the argument that defendants who wish to waive or withdraw their 
appeals are incompetent per se112—meaning that death row inmates who 
volunteer are evaluated on an ad hoc basis under the standard set forth 
in Rees—some contend that competent waiver is impossible given the 
context of death row.  According to White, who interviewed capital 
defense attorneys regarding volunteering: 
[Defense attorneys] often said that few, if any, capital 
defendants are able to make a rational judgment about 
whether they want to be executed.  They pointed out 
that many capital defendants have severe mental 
problems and that they seem incapable of making firm 
decisions about anything.  Moreover, according to 
defense attorneys, conditions on death row may often be 
sufficiently debilitating as to impede the decision-
making capacity of defendants who initially were 
rational.113 
                                                 
109 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
110 Jon Nordheimer, Death Wish Is Discerned In Poetry and Killings of Doomed Convict, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1976, at 15.  See also KUDLAC, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
111 See McClellan, supra note 26, at 235 (stating that “[t]he uncertainty of mental health 
sciences and the impossibility of knowing with certainty what is going on inside someone’s 
mind both contribute to the difficulty of determining competence”). 
112 Lenhard v. Wolff, 443 U.S. 1306, 1312–13 (1979).  See also Smith v. Armontrout, 812 
F.2d 1050, 1057 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating that “Rees clearly contemplates that competent 
waivers are possible”); Blank, supra note 18, at 764; Harrington, A Community Divided, supra 
note 11, at 852; McClellan, supra note 26, at 231.  
113 White, supra note 11, at 858–59.  See also Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life 
Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1136 (stating that “[i]n the death row context[,]“ it is 
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Similarly, Strafer contends that 
decisions to “waive” further legal challenges can almost 
invariably be traced to the unconscionable conditions to 
which [the] condemned are subjected.  Inmates are put 
to the Hobson’s choice of prolonged torture by 
incarceration or swift torture by execution.  An inmate’s 
“choice” of the latter alternative over the former is no 
more voluntary than a confession beaten out of a police 
suspect during a custodial interrogation; only the 
method utilized to exact that “choice” is unique. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he “realities” of life on death row convey to 
the prisoner such a resounding message that no “spoken 
words” of coercion need be expressed.  Through the 
daily indignities both big and small, the near total 
isolation which extends for years, the absence of 
virtually all activities, and other brutal conditions, the 
death row prisoner is “told” he is worthless and should 
be and will be dead.  The “choice” presented by the State 
is to die now or continue to be punished for challenging 
the State’s decision by the harsh regimes reigning on 
death row.114 
For Strafer, as with the capital defense lawyers interviewed by 
White, the Rees standard is inadequate because it ignores the reality of 
death row conditions and the impact that they likely have on the 
individuals’ level of psychological stress.115  As Strafer concludes: 
Stripped of the “psychological integrity” necessary to 
make a fully rational decision, death row inmates 
cannot, with any intellectual honesty, be considered to 
be acting voluntarily when they demand their swift 
executions. 
 . . . . 
                                                                                                             
possible that “poor prison conditions and the stress of life under a death sentence might 
obviate the possibility of a rational choice to be executed”). 
114 Strafer, supra note 12, at 863–88. 
115 See id. at 863, 890.  See also Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision 
Making, supra note 11, at 1110 (explaining the position that “the dreadful living conditions 
of most death row facilities, combined with the mental stress of living under a death 
sentence, significantly alter inmates’ abilities to make rational life-and-death decisions”). 
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Although prison conditions may not always render a 
condemned inmate’s decision legally “involuntary,” the 
ability of the inmate to make a truly autonomous 
decision is nevertheless severely restricted by the prison 
environment.116 
Others take a less extreme approach, arguing not that competent 
withdrawal is impossible (as a philosophical or psychological matter), 
but that “the conditions and long stay on death row cause inmates to 
lose mental competency and embrace death as an escape from death 
row”117—often referred to as “Death Row Syndrome” or “Death Row 
Phenomenon.”118  Although “Death Row Syndrome” or “Death Row 
Phenomenon” are legal terms, rather than clinical ones, and have not 
been recognized by the American Psychiatric Association (and do not 
appear in its handbook, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”)),119 some international courts have recognized the 
                                                 
116 Strafer, supra note 12, at 892, 907. 
117 Blank, supra note 18, at 737 n.12.  See also Death Penalty Information Center, Time on 
Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited 
Dec. 8, 2007); supra Part II. 
118 Blank, supra note 18, at 737 n.12 and accompanying text, 738, 749–56; Death Penalty 
Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php? 
&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007). 
Schiffrin articulates “death row phenomenon” slightly differently, referring to it as 
“the argument that prolonged detention on death row of itself constitutes cruel and 
unusual punishment.”  Natalia Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws the Right of Individual Petition 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 564–65 
(1998). 
Some mental health professionals refer to the “collection of psychological symptoms 
experienced by inmates confined in cells with little social interaction or other sensory 
stimulus, particularly for lengthy periods of time” as “‘SHU Syndrome’” (Segregated or 
Supermax Housing Unit Syndrome).  Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1025 n.18 (D. 
Ariz. 2002).  See also David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to Capital 
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 98–103 (January 1998).  These symptoms have also been 
characterized by mental health professionals as “Ad Seg Syndrome or Reduced 
Environmental Stimulus Syndrome (‘RES Syndrome’).”  Comer, 230 F.Supp.2d at 1025 n.18; 
Nan D. Miller, International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners:  Is Solitary Confinement in the 
United States a Violation of International Standards? 26 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 139, 162–69 (1995); 
Sally Mann Romano, If the SHU Fits:  Cruel and Unusual Punishment at California’s Pelican 
Bay State Prison, 45 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1110 n.124 and accompanying text, 1119 n.173 and 
accompanying text, 1132 nn.261–62 and accompanying text, 1133 n.269 and accompanying 
text (1996). 
119 Blank, supra note 18, at 752 nn.100–01 and accompanying text (citing David Wallace-
Wells, What Is Death Row Syndrome? And Who Came up with It?, Slate (Feb. 1, 2005), available 
at http://www.slate.com/id/2112901/). 
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syndrome or phenomenon as grounds for refusing extradition,120 as well 
as for commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment.121 
Not everyone believes that competent withdrawal is impossible or 
that those on death row who wish to waive or withdraw their appeals 
suffer from “Death Row Syndrome.”  In fact, some contend that 
volunteering permits condemned prisoners to uphold their dignity, 
autonomy, and self-esteem by recognizing them as adults able to make 
their own independent decisions.122  For example, Bonnie argues as 
follows: 
 A convicted prisoner does not become a pawn of the 
state.  Even a prisoner sentenced to death retains a 
constitutionally protected sphere of autonomy—of 
belief, expression, and, to a limited extent, action.  The 
state is bound to respect a convicted prisoner’s 
inalienable freedom of conscience.  He is free to admit 
his guilt and to repent, just as he is free to proclaim his 
innocence in defiance of the verdict under which he 
stands convicted.  He is free to resign himself to the 
social decree, acknowledging the justice of the 
punishment, just as he is free to decry it. 
 A condemned prisoner may believe that the 
sentence of death is justly deserved and should be 
carried out, notwithstanding the existence of doubts 
about its validity.  A condemned prisoner may prefer 
the unknowable fate of execution to the known pains of 
imprisonment, the only option likely to be available.  As 
long as the prisoner is competent to make an informed 
                                                 
120 Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 EUR. HUM. RTS. REV. 439 (1989); Soering v. United 
Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1989).  See also Blank, supra note 18, at 753–55; Death 
Penalty Information Center, Time on Death Row, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ 
article.php?&did=1397#drs (last visited Dec. 8, 2007). 
 But see Kindler v. Canada, No. 470/1991, reported at 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 307 (1993).  In 
Kindler v. Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court did not refuse extradition based on the 
possibility that the defendant could be subject to Death Row Syndrome.  Id.  See also Blank, 
supra note 18, at 755. 
121 See Pratt and Morgan v. Jam., Commc’n Nos. 210/1986, 225/1987 (views adopted Apr. 
7, 1987), UN Doc. CCPR/C.35/D.210/1986 and 225/1986; Earl Pratt and Another 
Appellant v. Attorney General for Jamaica and Another Respondents, [1994] 2 A.C. 1, 1993 
WL 963003, at *35–36 (P.C.) (appeal taken from the Court of Appeal of Jamaica); Pratt v. 
Att’y Gen. for Jam., [1994] 2 App. Cas. 1, 22.  See also Blank, supra note 18, at 754–55; 
Schiffrin, supra note 118, at 563–68. 
122 For a discussion of the difference between “choice” and “autonomy,” see SUSAN 
ORPETT LONG, FINAL DAYS:  JAPANESE CULTURE AND CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE 6 (2005). 
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and rational choice, the argument for respecting this 
choice would appear to be a powerful one.123 
While Bonnie endorses measures taken by courts to ensure that 
death row inmates are competent to make decisions about volunteering, 
he rejects the categorical view that condemned prisoners are incapable of 
exercising voluntary choice.124  For him, “[t]he view that the decisions of 
death penalty defendants or death-row inmates are never competent or 
voluntary undermines respect for the prisoner’s autonomy while 
pretending to honor it.”125  Elsewhere he writes:  “To ignore the 
prisoner’s preference in all cases, on grounds of ‘soft paternalism,’ 
undermines the principle of autonomy by pretending to respect it. . . .  I 
would not demean the dignity of the condemned as a price for society’s 
failure to abolish the death penalty.”126 
Bonnie’s contention that volunteering permits the condemned 
prisoner to uphold his dignity, autonomy, and self-esteem resonates 
with the findings of medical anthropologists, medical sociologists, and 
psychiatrists dealing more broadly with issues of choice and death.  For 
example, Susan Long in her exegesis on bioethics and end-of-life 
decision making in Japan, notes that “how to die has been added to the 
realm of what we can choose”127 and that the conscious construction of 
self occurs through the choices we make.128  Similarly, Ohnuki-Tierney, 
in her cross-cultural comparison of brain death and organ 
transplantation, writes: 
[T]he body is essential to the life and death of a person 
and to personhood. 
 . . . . 
 For the self-identity of individuals in all cultures, the 
body holds intense emotional power.  The existential 
seat of personhood is the body.  “I” is experienced 
through “my body” in relationship to others and their 
bodies.129 
While Ohnuki-Tierney’s observations would likely be met favorably 
by many individuals not on death row, one could well argue that they 
                                                 
123 Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1376.  See also Bonnie, supra note 22, at 72–73. 
124 Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1375 n.31. 
125 Id. 
126 Bonnie, supra note 23, at 102. 
127 LONG, supra note 122, at 5. 
128 Id. at 6. 
129 Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 15, at 236, 240. 
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have special relevance to the condemned prisoner whose body, as noted 
in Part II, is highly regulated and subjected to control by the State, and 
whose “[c]hoices are constrained by what is possible in [his] given 
environment[.]”130  His experience of “I” or sense of self is wrapped up 
in a body in relationship to others—just like that of a non-incarcerated 
person.  But he may regard State management and restriction of his body 
in all facets of his life as an infringement on his personhood, and thus 
consider volunteering as an (perhaps the only) opportunity to (again) 
experience himself as an “existential self,” rather than an “animated 
machine”131 or “depersonalized thing[.]”132 
In a similar vein, Ozawa-de Silva, writing about internet suicide 
pacts in Japan, argues: “to prevent suicide is to cruelly deprive 
individuals of one of the few, free, important acts an individual can 
make in an extremely conformist society.”133  Extending her ideas to the 
arena of volunteering, one could maintain that to prevent waiver or 
withdrawal of death penalty appeals is to cruelly deprive individuals of 
one of the few, free, important acts an individual can make in the hyper-
conformist prison society. 
This Article will return to the intersection of agency and autonomy, 
volunteering, and suicide later in Part IV.  But first, this Article sets forth 
a classificatory model for how one might consider the death row 
volunteer in light of State perspectives on, and the inmate’s expressed 
motivations for, waiver or withdrawal. 
IV.  DOCILE BODIES OR REBELLIOUS SPIRITS?:  THE INTENT OF THE 
VOLUNTEER (AND WHETHER IT MATTERS), THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE, 
AND WHAT THIS MAY REVEAL ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Docile Bodies 
At the beginning of Discipline and Punish, and as noted above in Part 
II, Foucault describes the execution of Damiens and the transition from 
                                                 
130 LONG, supra note 122, at 10. 
131 CECIL G. HELMAN, CULTURE, HEALTH AND ILLNESS:  AN INTRODUCTION FOR HEALTH 
PROFESSIONALS 81 (1994). 
132 TURNER, supra note 15, at 76. 
133 Ozawa-de Silva, supra note 80.  For an in-depth argument of the “right to suicide,” see 
THOMAS SZASZ, FATAL FREEDOM:  THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF SUICIDE (1999); THOMAS 
SZASZ, MY MADNESS SAVED ME:  THE MADNESS AND MARRIAGE OF VIRGINIA WOOLF (2006).  
See also TURNER, supra note 15, at 77–78 (discussing Szasz’s “anti-psychiatry” and positions 
with respect to the freedom to choose, the right of the patient to resist forced treatment, and 
his strident opposition to the insanity plea in criminal cases). 
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punishment aimed at the body to punishment aimed towards the soul.134  
Such a shift occurred, in part, to transform criminals in order to make 
them “docile” or useful135—“useful” in the sense of functioning and 
promoting the new economics (e.g., factories) and politics (e.g., military 
organization and warfare) of the modern industrial age.136  But what 
would a “docile” or “useful” body be in the context of the death penalty?  
Foucault is less than explicit in this sense—in part because the death 
penalty was on the wane at the time of his writing (the last execution in 
France occurred in 1977 and it was officially outlawed in 1981).137 
One could argue that a “docile body” in the death penalty context 
refers to the volunteer—the “pliant mind”138—the individual who “rolls 
over” and allows the State to carry out its sentence (in contrast to the 
death row inmate who continues to fight his sentence).  This would 
appear to constitute a reconceptualization of Foucault’s notion of “docile 
bodies” and would appear to treat “docility” in normative terms139 
because a dead body is not particularly “useful” in the Foucauldian 
sense (i.e., in terms of promoting efficiency in factories, military 
regiments, and school classrooms).  Or so it would appear. 
According to Foucault, in the nineteenth century, crime became 
not a potentiality that interests or passions have 
inscribed in the hearts of all men, but that it [became] 
almost exclusively committed by a certain social class; 
that criminals, who were once to be met with in every 
                                                 
134 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 3, 31.  See also NANCY SCHEPER-HUGHES, DEATH WITHOUT 
WEEPING:  THE VIOLENCE OF EVERYDAY LIFE IN BRAZIL 220–21 (1992).  See generally Anton 
Blok, The Symbolic Vocabulary of Public Executions, in HISTORY AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF 
LAW:  NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31, 46–47, 51 (June Starr & Jane F. Collier, 
eds., 1989). 
135 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 135, 70, 69.   See also FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 139–41; 
DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY:  A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 136 
(1990); John O’Neill, The Disciplinary Society:  From Weber to Foucault,  37 BRITISH JOURNAL 
OF SOCIOLOGY 42, 42–43, 54 (1986); OZAWA-DE SILVA, supra note 88, at 33; Nancy Scheper-
Hughes & Margaret M. Lock, The Mindful Body:  A Prolegomenon to Future Work in Medical 
Anthropology, 1 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 6, 8 (1987); TURNER, supra note 15, at 34. 
136 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 135–69.  See also GARLAND, supra note 135, at 131–55. 
137 See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 137–38; MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER:  ESSENTIAL 
WORKS OF FOUCAULT 459–61 (James D. Faubion, ed., Robert Hurley, et al. trans., 1994).   
138 Scheper-Hughes & Lock, supra note 135, at 8. 
139 As an example of “‘docility’” in normative terms, consider Strafer’s comment that 
“[i]n the extermination camps of Nazi Germany, prisoners were repressed into ‘docility’ to 
the point where they ‘walked to the gas chambers or . . . dug their own graves and then 
lined up before them so that, shot down, they would fall into the graves.’”  Strafer, supra 
note 12, at 872 n.46 (quoting B. BETTLEHEIM, THE INFORMED HEART 250 (1960)). 
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social class, now emerged almost all from the bottom 
rank of the social order.140 
Foucault continues that not only has prison failed to eliminate crime, but 
that 
prison has succeeded extremely well in producing 
delinquency, a specific type, a politically or 
economically less dangerous—and, on occasion, 
usable—form of illegality; in producing delinquents, in 
an apparently marginal, but in fact centrally supervised 
milieu; in producing the delinquent as a pathologized 
subject. 
 . . . . 
 . . . .  Because the prison facilitates the supervision of 
individuals when they are released, because it makes 
possible the recruiting of informers and multiplies 
mutual denunciations, because it brings offenders into 
contact with one another, it precipitates the organization 
of a delinquent milieu, closed in upon itself, but easily 
supervised:  and all the results of non-rehabilitation 
(unemployment, prohibitions on residence, enforced 
residences, probation) make it all too easy for former 
prisoners to carry out the tasks assigned to them.  Prison 
and police form a twin mechanism; together they assure 
in the whole field of illegalities the differentiation, 
isolation[,] and use of delinquency.  In the illegalities, 
the police-prison system segments a manipulable 
delinquency.  This delinquency, with its specificity, is a 
result of the system; but it also becomes a part and an 
instrument of it.  So that one should speak of an 
ensemble whose three terms (police—prison—
delinquency) support one another and form a circuit 
that is never interrupted.  Police surveillance provides 
the prison with offenders, which the prison transforms 
into delinquents, the targets and auxiliaries of police 
supervisions, which regularly send back a certain 
number of them to prison.141 
                                                 
140 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 275. 
141 Id. at 277, 281–82. 
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As Garland explains, Foucault makes the “argument that the 
creation of delinquency is useful in a strategy of political domination 
because it works to separate crime from politics, to divide the working 
classes against themselves, to enhance the fear of prison, and to 
guarantee the authority and powers of the police.”142 
Extending this avenue of inquiry, one could argue that the death 
penalty thus functions as a supreme example or reminder of the 
undesirability of prison and “the authority and powers of the police”—
what Paredes and Purdum refer to as the “validation-of-law 
hypothesis[.]”143  For them, 
capital punishment in contemporary America functions 
as the ultimate validator of law, serving “to reassure 
many that society is not out of control after all, that the 
majesty of the Law reigns, and that God is indeed in his 
heaven”, [sic] in much the same way the Aztec rituals 
reassured the population that the state was healthy and 
the Sun would remain in the heavens.144 
As they explain, “many do take special comfort in the affirmation of 
authority and order which capital punishment seems to provide—
especially when the executed is such a vile smart-aleck as the likes of Ted 
Bundy.”145  Following this line of thinking, one could maintain that the 
“docile body” is the body that is used by the State to flex its muscle when 
need be. 
But if this is the case—if the death row inmate really is a “docile 
body”—what is the significance of “volunteering”?  If the State has 
retained the death penalty in order to promote its strength and power 
when needed, then does it matter whether the prisoner fights the State 
(by fighting his sentence) or not?  Again, one might be tempted to argue 
that a situation where the “volunteer” rolls over—gives up because he 
does not wish to grow old in prison because he can no longer stand the 
                                                 
142 GARLAND, supra note 135, at 149–50.  See FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 264–92. 
143 Paredes & Purdum, supra note 79, at 9. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 11.  See also J. Anthony Paredes, Capital Punishment in the USA, 9 ANTHROPOLOGY 
TODAY 16, 16 (1993).  Paredes states,  
capital punishment in America promotes confidence in the existing 
social order and is an institutionalized magical response to perceived 
disorder. . . .  [M]any Americans cling to the hope that by ritually 
executing an occasional murderer (from among thousands)[,] order will 
be restored as surely as collectively sanctioned killing of a threatening 
deviant restored social harmony in the (imagined) tribal or frontier or 
agrarian or small town or old neighbourhood past. 
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conditions of death row—is desired by the State.  This is a “super-docile” 
or “super-useful” body—it shows the power of the State not only over 
the body (in the sense of corporeal death), but also over the soul and will 
of the prisoner to live.  While some claim that the State wants death row 
inmates to volunteer,146 most courts and commentators suggest the 
opposite—that the State, consistent with its desire to dictate the meaning 
of death and suicide and the circumstances under which death occurs, 147 
does not favor waiver or withdrawal. 
First and foremost, and as noted above, the State has an interest in 
the preservation of life and the prevention of suicide148—an interest that 
does not end once an individual is sentenced to prison or death.149  In 
fact, courts have been particularly sensitive to the “self-destructive 
motivations”150 of volunteers and have taken measures and explicitly 
expressed the desire to avoid complicity in state-assisted suicide.151  Even 
                                                 
Id. 
146 See Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 864 (stating that “[m]ost 
attorneys believe the courts are more than willing to set a speedy execution date for 
inmates claiming to want one even if the desire is not sustained”).  See generally Harrington, 
Mental Competence and End-of-Life Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1130, 1133 (noting that 
the attorneys he studied “believe the national pro-death penalty climate shapes how courts 
frame the meaning of elected executions (i.e., as freely made expressions of inmate 
autonomy) and thus how they respond to inmates wishing to waive postconviction 
appeals[,]” and that attorneys “fear the courts strategically construct decisions to waive 
appeals as a competent exercise of inmate autonomy[;]” and thus, they conclude that 
“[a]llowing inmates to volunteer, . . . both confirms and perpetuates the pro-death penalty 
climate in the United States.”).  
147 See supra Part III. 
148 Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 864; McClellan, supra note 26, at 
215; Strafer, supra note 12, at 896, 903. 
149 For example, the state is permitted to force-feed a hunger-striking prisoner.  See 
Brisman, supra note 27, at 86; McClellan, supra note 26, at 215. 
150 George F. Solomon, Capital Punishment as Suicide and as Murder, in CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 432, 433 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Chester M. Pierce, eds., 
1975). 
151 Whitemore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 172 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[A] 
wrongful execution is an affront to society as a whole”); Hammett v. Texas, 448 U.S. 725, 
726 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s granting of a 
motion by a pro se death-row inmate to withdraw his petition for review with the Supreme 
Court on the grounds that the Court’s actions constituted an approval of “‘state-
administered suicide’”); Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 1103 (1981) (prohibiting the defendant from waiving review of his death sentence on 
the grounds that “[t]he state of California has a strong interest in the accuracy and fairness 
of all its criminal proceedings”); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174, 181 (Pa. 1978) 
(explaining that “the waiver concept was never intended as a means of allowing a criminal 
defendant to choose his own sentence.  Especially is this so where, as here, to do so would 
result in state aided suicide.”); Grasso v. State, 857 P.2d 802, 811 (Okla. 1993) (Chapel, J., 
specially concurring).  The court stated that 
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in situations where courts have permitted waiver or withdrawal—such 
as in Hamblen—courts have recognized “the friction between an 
individual’s right to control his destiny and society’s duty to see that 
executions do not become a vehicle by which a person could commit 
suicide.”152 
Part of this heightened concern stems from the “murder/suicide 
phenomena” that is often present in death penalty cases in general and 
waiver and withdrawal cases in particular.153  According to Strafer, 
“[t]he ‘murder/suicide’ phenomenon refers to the clinically recognized 
syndrome in which an individual intentionally commits murder in a 
state with a death penalty hoping that, once caught, the State will 
execute him and thereby accomplish what he himself cannot bring about 
by his own hand.”154 
At first blush, this might seem like an odd reason to commit murder 
and thus a rare occurrence in United States death penalty jurisprudence.  
But according to Strafer, “the impulse to murder is often preceded by a 
history of failed attempts at suicide.”155  This was the case in People v. 
                                                                                                             
the State of Oklahoma has a keen interest in assuring that its system of 
justice is not being manipulated or abused by a defendant.  The State 
must not become an unwitting partner in a defendant’s suicide by 
placing the personal desires of the defendant above the societal 
interests in assuring that the death penalty is imposed in a rational, 
non-arbitrary fashion. 
Id.  See generally Lenhard ex rel. Bishop v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 811–12 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting from decision denying stay of execution) (reasoning that “[b]y refusing to 
pursue his Eighth Amendment claim, Bishop has, in effect, sought the State’s assistance in 
committing suicide”). 
 Compare C. Lee Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 11, at 875 (noting that 
“[t]he legal literature refers to volunteering as state-assisted suicide, a phrase defense 
attorneys suggest has two meanings—that the state actually performs the killing through 
executions and that the state provides an impetus or ‘shove’ toward suicide[,]” and 
suggesting that the more appropriate term might be “client-assisted homicide.”), with 
Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1363, 1375 ( 
The prisoner’s interest in controlling his own fate is often denigrated 
by proponents of aggressive judicial review as amounting to nothing 
more than ‘state-administered suicide.’  This is hyperbole, of course; 
only if execution of a lawfully imposed death sentence amounts to 
homicide is the state an agent of suicide when it executes a competent 
prisoner who has declined to contest his death sentence. 
) (footnote omitted), and Bonnie, supra note 22, at 72 (same). 
152 Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1988). 
153 Strafer, supra note 12, at 863. 
154 Id. at 863 n.12. 
155 Id. at 865.  According to Strafer, “decisions to plead guilty or waive post-conviction 
remedies in capital cases . . . . reflect either the intentional death wish of the condemned, as 
in the ‘murder/suicide’ phenomenon, or the synergistic effect of the panic attendant to the 
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Cash, where the defendant, having twice attempted suicide, 
unsuccessfully, and unable to determine the method for his third try, 
“decided that if he killed [someone] the State would take his life.”156  
Similarly, White offers the following commentary: 
Psychiatrists have long recognized that some killers’ 
motivation for killing is to bring about their own 
execution. . . .  [T]his motivation may be unconscious 
and impossible to establish with scientific certainty.  In 
others, however, the killer’s desire to be executed may 
be conscious.  Psychiatrists have documented cases in 
which killers have openly stated that their reason for 
killing was to have the state execute them.157 
Likewise, McClellan notes: 
Frequently, persons who seek the death penalty are 
suicidal individuals who killed expressly for the 
purpose of getting the death penalty—the so-called 
“murder-suicide” syndrome. . . .  [Some condemned 
prisoners] may have killed because they wanted the 
state to end their lives.  Execution then becomes state-
assisted suicide.  For people with suicidal tendencies, 
                                                                                                             
anticipation of death by execution accompanied by continued existence in the insufferable 
environs of death row.”  Id. at 875. 
156 People v. Cash, 345 P.2d 462, 463 (Cal. 1959).  See also Strafer, supra note 12, at 865. 
 Like Cash, James D. French, the last person executed in Oklahoma prior to Furman v. 
Georgia and the only person executed in the United States in 1966, had seriously attempted 
suicide several times prior to killing his cellmate (after having received a life sentence for 
murdering a motorist).  See Katherine van Wormer, Execution-Inspired Murder a Form of 
Suicide?, 22 J. OFFENDER REHAB. 1, 1–10 (1995); West, supra note 70, at 419, 426–27.  As West 
explains: 
[d]uring a psychiatric examination in 1965, French admitted to me that 
he had seriously attempted suicide several times in the past but always 
“chickened out” at the last minute.  His basic (and obviously 
abnormal) motive in murdering his inoffensive cellmate was to force 
the State to deliver to him the electrocution to which he felt entitled 
and which he deeply desired.  French was the only man who was 
executed in the United States during 1966.  He had successfully forced 
the State of Oklahoma to fulfill its contract to reward murder with 
murder.  If Oklahoma had not had the death penalty, it is likely that 
both of the men murdered by James French would still be alive. 
West, supra note 70, at 427.  See also White, supra note 11, at 874–75. 
157 White, supra note 11, at 874 (footnote omitted). 
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therefore, the death penalty may actually encourage 
murder.158 
The idea that the death penalty may actually encourage murder 
resonates with West, who writing in the mid-1970s, states: 
I am convinced that there is an even more specific way 
in which the death penalty breeds murder.  It becomes 
more than a symbol.  It becomes a promise, a contract, a 
covenant between society and certain (by no means rare) 
warped mentalities who are moved to kill as part of a 
self-destructive urge.  These murders are discovered by 
the psychiatric examiner to be, consciously or 
unconsciously, perpetrated in an attempt to commit 
suicide by committing homicide.  It only works if the 
perpetrator believes he will be executed for his crime.  I 
believe this to be a significant reason for the tendency to 
find proportionally more homicides in death penalty 
states than in those without it.  I even know of cases 
where the murderer left an abolitionist state deliberately 
to commit a meaningless murder in an executionist state, 
in the hope thereby of forcing society to destroy him.159 
Although West’s contentions predate Gilmore’s volunteering and 
execution, the statements could easily apply to him:  after serving 
sentences in Oregon and Illinois for robbery and assault, Gilmore was 
paroled and decided to relocate to Utah—a state that, at the time, 
employed the firing squad as its method of execution—rather than 
                                                 
158 Jane L. McClellan, Stopping the Rush to the Death House:  Third-Party Standing in Death-
Row Volunteer Cases, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 201, 214 (1994) (footnotes omitted).  As McClellan 
further explains,  
[w]hen death-row inmates volunteer for execution, the state 
becomes a vehicle for fulfilling their suicidal desires. . . .  The courts 
allow waiver of counsel under the guise of preserving defendants’ 
autonomy.  At some point, inmates’ interests in ending protracted 
appellate review of their cases may override third-party interests.  
However, defendants may be choosing their sentences by manipulating 
the judicial system:  confessing to the crime; not cooperating with or 
firing attorneys; not presenting mitigating evidence at sentencing; and 
waiving appeals. 
Id. at 240 (footnote omitted). 
 For an early discussion of the “murder-suicide” phenomenon (although the term itself 
is not used), see Robert Fletcher, The New School of Criminal Anthropology, 4 AM. 
ANTHROPOLOGIST 201, 216 (1891). 
159 West, supra note 70, at 419, 426 (citation omitted). 
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return to his home state of Oregon, which had no death penalty.160  
According to Dr. John C. Woods, chief of forensic psychiatry at Utah 
State Hospital and one of the psychiatrists who examined Gilmore before 
his trial, 
‘Knowing he did not want to return to prison, [Gilmore] 
took the steps necessary to turn the job of his own 
destruction over to someone else. . . .  He went out of his 
way to get the death penalty; that’s why he pulled two 
execution-style murders he was bound to be caught for.  
I think it’s a legitimate question, based on this evidence 
and our knowledge of the individual, to ask if Gilmore 
would have killed if there was not a death penalty in 
Utah.’161 
While Gilmore may be the most famous example of the 
murder/suicide phenomena and of an individual relocating to a state 
with the death penalty in order to improve his chances for “suicide-by-
State,”162 others have been inspired by Gilmore and have attempted to 
procure the same results163—demonstrating that “some defendants kill 
so that society will execute them.”164  Thus, the State, besides its 
“normal” interest in the preservation of life and the prevention of 
suicide,165 has a potentially heightened interest in preventing its system 
of justice from being transformed into an “instrument of self-
destruction.”166 
In addition to the preservation of life and avoidance of state-assisted 
suicide, the State also possesses an interest in safeguarding the integrity 
of the proceedings.  As McClellan insists, “The state also has a strong 
interest in ensuring that trial and sentencing are fair and that only death-
deserving defendants receive the death penalty.”167  Similarly, White 
                                                 
160 Jon Nordheimer, Death Wish Is Discerned in Poetry and Killings of Doomed Convict, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1976, at 15. 
161 Id. (quoting Dr. John C. Woods, chief of forensic psychiatry at Utah State Hospital). 
162 “Suicide-by-State” is akin to “‘suicide by cop’” or SBC—“an instance in which a 
person attempts to commit suicide by provoking the police to use deadly force.”  See, e.g., 
Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 797 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000). 
163 See Judy v. State, 416 N.E.2d 95, 98, 100 (Ind. 1981).  See also White, supra note 11, at 
854. 
164 Id. at 877. 
165 See supra Part III. 
166 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 840 (1975) (Burger, J., dissenting).  See also White, 
supra note 11, at 865 n.45 and accompanying text. 
167 McClellan, supra note 26 at 216.  McClellan also contends that 
the death penalty is a unique, final punishment.  Society does not 
suffer in the same way from a defendant’s waiver of appeal in a minor 
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contends that “society has a special interest in making sure that death 
sentences are imposed only in accordance with the rule of law.  
Moreover, in view of the concerns expressed in Furman v. Georgia, the 
public has an interest in ensuring that the death penalty not be imposed 
arbitrarily.”168  Expanding on this line of reasoning, Harrington 
articulates the position that the State has 
an interest in upholding the Eighth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution (which provides, among other things, 
protection from cruel and unusual punishment); an 
interest in ensuring that innocent persons not be 
executed; an interest in ensuring the validity of the 
conviction and sentence through the appellate process; 
and an interest in not allowing inmates to choose their 
own sentencing.169 
Strafer agrees, but presents his argument slightly differently, 
couching it much in the same way the Hamblen court did170—as a tension 
between the State’s interests in preserving life and the integrity of the 
proceedings, on the one hand, and the inmate’s right to personal 
autonomy on the other.  For Strafer, what tips the scales in favor of the 
State’s interest,171 is that he adds factors such as the interest in protecting 
                                                                                                             
felony case because the result is only a few years in prison for the 
defendant.  When the state executes an inmate, it does so on behalf of 
all citizens of that state. 
Id. at 228. 
168 White, supra note 11, at 865 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).  According 
to White, “[t]hese [State] interests may be adequately protected without requiring every 
capital defendant to oppose the death penalty.”  Id. 
169 Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note, at 851.  See generally Jeffrey Toobin, 
Death in Georgia, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 4, 2008, at 32, 35 (discussing the case of Brian 
Nichols, who shot and killed four people after escaping from custody at the Fulton County 
Courthouse in Atlanta, GA in March 2005, his offer to plead guilty to every count in his 
indictment and accept a life sentence in exchange for the district attorney’s agreement to 
abandon pursuit of the death penalty, and the district attorney’s rejection of the plea offer 
on the grounds that “‘[m]y belief is that punishment is a question that should be decided 
by the community.  It is not appropriate to kill four people and outline for the citizens what 
his punishment should be.  I don’t think the defendant should choose his own 
punishment.’”) (quoting Fulton County district attorney Paul Howard). 
170 See supra note 150.  See also supra note 120–31 and accompanying text. 
171 Strafer, supra note 12, at 896.  Strafer concludes that “the governmental interest in 
ensuring that the death penalty is administered in a constitutional manner should always 
take precedence over the inmate’s ‘right to die.’”  Id.  Cf. Bonnie, supra note 11, at 1390–91.  
Bonnie states, 
I believe that the prisoner’s interest in controlling his own fate should be 
subordinated to a societal interest in the integrity of the legal process 
only in situations in which it is necessary to assure that the prisoner has 
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the integrity of the legal profession,172 the interests of the inmate’s family 
members (who frequently do not endorse the decision to volunteer),173 
the “federal interest in ensuring that a particular crime is deserving of the 
death penalty”174 (as distinct from an interest in ensuring that a 
particular offender is deserving of the death penalty),175 and, finally, “an 
interest in refusing to enforce punishments that serve no purpose.”176 
This last point is particularly important to Strafer and especially 
relevant to the discussion below in Part IV.B.  According to Strafer, 
punishment in general and the death penalty in particular serve the twin 
aims of deterrence and retribution.  For him, “Deterrence is not served 
by executing the individual who murdered only because he wished to 
die but does not have the courage to do it himself[]”177—as in the case of 
the murder/suicide phenomenon.  With the volunteer, the State also 
does not achieve its goal of retribution:  “Even the State’s interest in 
retribution is diluted in the volunteer context.  To the extent that 
execution is sought only because the inmate considers it less painful than 
life imprisonment, the State’s interests in retribution are probably better 
served by requiring life imprisonment.”178  In other words, by refusing to 
                                                                                                             
committed an offense for which the death penalty has been prescribed.  
Indeed, I believe that the law’s duty to respect individual dignity is 
heightened, not diminished, when choices are made in the shadow of 
death. 
Id. 
172 Strafer, supra note 12, at 904–05.  According to Strafer, 
[t]he State also has an interest in protecting the integrity of the 
legal profession, just as it has an interest in “the maintenance of the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession.”  A lawyer has an ethical 
obligation to intervene on his client’s behalf when “[a]ny mental or 
physical condition of a client . . . renders him incapable of making a 
considered judgment on his own behalf.”  Allowing a condemned 
inmate to waive further appeals may conflict with this ethical 
obligation, particularly where the inmate initially sought to avoid the 
death penalty and professes a desire to waive appeals only after a long 
incarceration on death row. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
173 See id. at 895–908. 
174 Id. at 902. 
175 White, supra note 11, at 866 (stating that “[t]he issue of arbitrariness poses greater 
problems.  If capital defendants are permitted to seek their own executions, the system will 
inevitably be less effective in selecting only the most heinous offenders for execution”). 
176 Strafer, supra note 12, at 904 (citation omitted).  See generally Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 
584, 592 (1977) (stating that “a punishment is ‘excessive’ and unconstitutional if 
it . . . makes no measurable contribution to acceptable goals of punishment and hence is 
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering”). 
177 Strafer, supra note 12, at 904.  
178 Id.  See also West, supra note 70, at 425 (contending that the “the basic motive for 
executions [is] revenge”). 
Brisman: "Docile Bodies" or Rebellious Spirits?: Issues of Time and Power
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
500 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
fight his conviction and sentence, thereby clearing the path to his 
execution, the inmate removes the State’s ability to treat his death as 
repayment for the crime, proportional to the harm that was caused.  In so 
doing, the inmate wrestles control of the meaning of his own death away 
from the State179—or in Foucauldian terms, “usurp[s] the power of death 
which the sovereign alone[] . . . had the right to exercise”180—an idea 
explored in greater detail below.  
B. Rebellious Spirits 
Toward the end of the first volume of The History of Sexuality, 
Foucault introduces the term “bio-power,” which he uses to refer to the 
practice of modern states to regulate the conduct of their subjects as 
entire populations and as individual bodies in all aspects of life,181 and 
which he claims has been indispensible to the development of the 
modern nation-state and capitalism.182  But for many scholars, 
Foucauldian notions of power are problematic because they do not 
contemplate and fail to account for opposition or resistance.183  For 
example, Turner argues that “given the power of discipline and 
                                                 
179 See generally Davis, supra note 15, at 46 (arguing that “the adversarial nature of the 
criminal sentencing trial has collapsed when the defendant concedes his death”). 
180 FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 138. 
181 Id. at 140 (“Hence there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for 
achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning 
of an era of ‘bio-power.’”).  See generally GARLAND, supra note 135, at 136 (describing 
Foucault’s notion of how power operates in modern society—“[t]he idea now is to regulate 
thoroughly and at all times rather than to repress in fits and starts”). 
 The term “bio-power” is closely related to the Foucauldian concept of “biopolitics” or 
“biopolitical.”  Foucault employs the former term more frequently, but subsequent scholars 
have taken up and developed the latter.  See, e.g., AIHWA ONG, FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP:  THE 
CULTURAL LOGICS OF TRANSNATIONALITY 120 (1999) (explaining that “[c]itizenship 
requirements are the consequence of Foucauldian ‘biopolitics,’ in which the state regulates 
the conduct of subjects as population (by age, ethnicity, occupation, and so on) and as 
individuals (sexual and reproductive behavior) so as to ensure security and prosperity for 
the nation as a whole”).  Margaret Lock and Nancy Scheper-Hughes, medical 
anthropologists whom the author of this Article cites at various junctures throughout this 
Article, use the term “body politic” to refer to “regulation, surveillance, and control of 
bodies (individual and collective) in reproduction and sexuality, work, leisure, and 
sickness.”  Margaret Lock & Nancy Scheper-Hughes, A Critical-Interpretive Approach in 
Medical Anthropology:  Rituals and Routines of Discipline and Dissent, in READINGS FOR A 
HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL THEORY 486, 489 (Paul A. Erickson & Liam D. Murphy, 
eds., 1990). 
182 FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 94–95. 
183 This is not to suggest that criticisms of Foucault are limited to issues of power and 
resistance.  For example, Ozawa-de Silva criticized Foucault on the grounds that his 
“extensive discussion of the body still leaves the ‘body’ as a rather abstract entity rather 
than focusing more closely on specific aspects of embodied experience.”  OZAWA-DE SILVA, 
supra note 88, at 34. 
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surveillance, it is difficult to know how one would explain or locate 
opposition, resistance[,] and criticism to medical (or any other form of) 
dominance.”184  Similarly, Garland contends that: 
Foucault’s tendency to discuss the spread of discipline 
as if it were politically unopposed is a serious deficiency 
in his account. . . .  [I]t ignores all the forces which 
operate to restrain the disciplinary impulse and to 
protect liberties.  What is in fact a description of the 
control potential possessed by modern power-knowledge 
technologies is presented as if it were the reality of their 
present-day operation.  It is a worst-case scenario which 
ignores the strength of countervailing forces.185 
Hardt and Negri take a different tack.  Rather than critiquing 
Foucault per se, they build on his concept of “bio-power,” claiming that 
some acts, such as suicide bombings, function as essentially the 
“opposite of biopower” or challenge the pervasiveness and omnipotence 
of bio-power by using life and body as weapons: 
A sovereign power is always two-sided:  a dominating 
power always relies on the consent or submission of the 
dominated.  The power of sovereignty is thus always 
limited, and this limit can always potentially be 
transformed into resistance, a point of vulnerability, a 
threat.  The suicide bomber appears here . . . as a symbol 
of the inevitable limitation and vulnerability of 
sovereign power; refusing to accept a life of submission, 
the suicide bomber turns life into a horrible weapon.  
This is the ontological limit of biopower in its most magic and 
revolting form.186 
                                                 
184 TURNER, supra note 15, at 14. 
185 GARLAND, supra note 135, at 167–68.  To his credit, Foucault does mention 
“resistance.”  But it is a dim view of resistance:  “Where there is power, there is resistance, 
and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in 
relation to power.”  FOUCAULT, supra note 80, at 95.  As Knauft explains, “Foucault suggests 
that resisting this power is particularly difficult; what seems to be opposition against 
power or authority is often just a superficial reshuffling of terms or allegiances at the level 
of content.”  BRUCE M. KNAUFT, GENEALOGIES FOR THE PRESENT:  CULTURAL 
ANTHROPOLOGY 142 (1996).  See also MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY LIFE 
45–61 (1984) (critiquing Foucault for failing to consider the role of tactical resistance in 
practices of everyday life). 
186 HARDT & NEGRI, supra note 31, at 54. 
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Later on, they expound: 
Once we recognize sovereignty as a dynamic two-sided 
relationship [between rulers and ruled] we can begin to 
recognize the contradictions that continually appear 
within sovereignty.  Consider, first of all, the modern 
military figure of sovereignty, that is, the power to 
decide over the life and death of subjects.  The constant 
development of technologies of mass destruction 
throughout the modern era arriving finally at nuclear 
weapons has . . . made this prerogative of sovereignty 
approach something absolute.  The sovereign in 
possession of nuclear weapons rules almost completely 
over death.  Even this seemingly absolute power, 
however, is radically thrown into question by practices 
that refuse the control over life, such as, for example, 
suicidal actions, from the protest of the Buddhist monk 
who sets himself on fire to the terrorist suicide bomber.  
When life itself is negated in the struggle to challenge 
sovereignty, the power over life and death that the 
sovereign exercises becomes useless.  The absolute 
weapons against bodies are neutralized by the voluntary 
and absolute negation of the body.  Furthermore, the 
death of subjects in general undermines the power of the 
sovereign:  without the subjects[,] the sovereign rules 
not over society but an empty wasteland.  The exercise 
of this absolute sovereignty becomes contradictory with 
sovereignty itself.187 
In light of these observations, one could suggest that the volunteer 
can and may function as an opposite of or in opposition to bio-power—as a 
“rebellious spirit.”  Clearly, not every volunteer does or would, and the 
determination would depend in part on the intent of the condemned 
prisoner wishing to waive or withdraw his appeals.  For example, the 
death row inmate who can no longer tolerate the dehumanizing 
conditions of most death row facilities or who experiences severe 
depression or who possesses pre-existing suicidal urges that nonetheless 
do not prevent his understanding his legal position and the options 
available to him probably would not be regarded as stretching the 
“ontological limits of biopower.”188  On the other hand, the prisoner who 
                                                 
187 Id. at 332–33. 
188 See supra text accompanying note 186. 
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wishes to “escape the roller-coaster experience of the habeas appeals 
process or to seize control over it,” or who indicates a desire for a 
“‘macho’ confrontation with death,”189 or who positions his volunteering 
as a rebuff to the State might well be considered a symbol of the 
inevitable limitation and vulnerability of sovereign or State power. 
Certainly, the volunteer in the death penalty context—the individual 
who waives or withdraws his appeals—does not transform his body into 
the same type of weapon as the suicide bomber, whose circumstances 
and political (and potentially religious) motivations are different,190 
whose actions may carry distinct cultural currency,191 and who may 
cause dozens of deaths along with his own.192  But his actions may well 
merit inclusion in a (broad) discussion that includes both suicide 
bombers and individuals engaging in hunger strikes or self-immolation. 
To explicate, it might be useful to consider Wee’s conception of an 
“extreme communicative act” (“ECA”)—a term he employs to refer to 
nonlinguistic communicative acts that are “typically associated with 
                                                 
189 See supra text accompanying note 106. 
190 The author of this Article is indebted to Moyukh Chatterjee for pointing this out. 
191 That suicide and suicide bombing each hold divergent and culturally-specific 
meanings should not be overlooked.  See JACK D. DOUGLAS, THE SOCIAL MEANINGS OF 
SUICIDE (1967).  See generally Mark Halsey, Against ‘Green’ Criminology, 44 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 833, 841 n.9 (2004) (explaining that “[m]achines of axiomisation (e.g. the law 
machine) will tend toward the former [permanent and natural,] whereas machines of 
absolute decoding (e.g. the terrorist machine) tend toward the latter [contestable and 
reworkable ]”).  See generally LOCK, supra note 15, at 195.  Halsey describes how 
Japan is a society acutely sensitive to the way in which the social order 
may be contested through death practices.  Ritual suicides by samurai, 
generals, unrequited lovers, and famous authors are feted as part of 
Japan’s tradition, both inside the country and outside it.  Taking one’s 
life to make a statement about the condition of society, or the worth of a 
cause, or alternatively about a perceived failure of self or another to 
meet society’s expectations, are long-standing practices in Japan. 
Halsey, supra note 191, at 841 n.9.  See also Michael Moss & Souad Mekhennet, The 
Guidebook for Taking a Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at § 4:1, 3 (discussing the “jihad 
etiquette”—the unwritten set of “rules” that guide and justify the killing that militants 
commit); Ozawa-de Silva, supra note 80 (pointing out that “[i]n Japan . . . one of the 
dominant features in the rhetoric of suicide has been cultural anesthetization, whereby 
certain suicides are given a positive cultural valence” (citations omitted)); Suicide:  Elusive, 
But Not Always Unstoppable, ECONOMIST 63, 63 (June 23, 2007) (explaining that “Japan is a 
conformist society, and life, it is said, is bleak for those who do not fit in.  It has a tradition 
of self-killing, which in some forms, such as the ritualised seppuku (‘belly-cutting’) of the 
samurai, may still be deemed honourable, even noble.”); cf. Kim Gamel, Teens Forced To Be 
Human Bombs, THE HONOLULU ADVERTISER, May 27, 2008, at A3 (describing weeping 
teenagers claiming to have been forced into training for suicide bombings by Saudi 
militants in Iraq). 
192 Death penalty volunteers (with the exception of situations such as Gilmore’s) are also 
less likely to attract the same level of media attention as suicide bombers.    See generally 
Stephen Holden, Learning To Empathize with a Suicide Bomber, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at B5. 
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protests, particularly in the context of a lengthy political 
struggle[,] . . . occur ‘late’ in the interactional sequence, that is, after a 
number of less dramatic expressions of protest have already been 
employed[,] and . . . involve some form of self-inflicted harm, which can 
sometimes be fatal.”193  Wee’s primary example involves politically-
oriented or politically-inspired hunger strikes and acts of self-
immolation.194  Given that the volunteer does not possess a commitment 
to a specific, prior political position (although one may regard his 
crime(s) in political terms, i.e., as a comment on class structure or socio-
economic status) and lacks allegiance to a broader political cause 
(although the volunteer may come to regard himself as part of a larger 
confederacy of death row inmates opposing the State), the analogy is not 
perfect.195  And there may also be some issue with the fact that Wee 
considers it crucial that the acts be “self-inflicted since they are intended 
to express the strength of the actors’ own commitment to a specific 
position.”196  But the “close relation[ship] between ECAs and the notion 
of martyrdom”197 and the “assymetrical power relationship where the 
actor who engages in an ECA is in the position of lesser power”198—both 
relevant in the context of waiver and withdrawal of death penalty 
appeals—help illustrate how the volunteer may not be a “docile body” in 
either normative or Foucauldian terms, but a “rebellious spirit” 
undermining the power of the State. 
How does the volunteer work to subvert the power of the State?  The 
initial and most obvious way has already been noted:  by challenging 
State interests in the preservation of life and the prevention of suicide, as 
well as the State’s desire to forestall the murder/suicide phenomena and 
                                                 
193 Lionel Wee, ‘Extreme Communicative Acts’ and the Boosting of Illocutionary Force, 36 J. 
PRAGMATICS 2161, 2162–163 (2004). 
194 See id.  See also Lionel Wee, The Hunger Strike as a Communicative Act:  Intention Without 
Responsibility, 17 J. LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY 61, 63 (2007). 
195 See Wee, supra note 193, at 2171.  Wee explains: 
While all the ECAs are aimed at expressing the strength of the actors’ 
commitment to specific positions, in both the IRA and Kurdish 
examples, the ECAs seem to be further prompted by the desire to 
actually achieve a particular goal by getting somebody to do something 
(e.g., to grant political status to the IRA prisoners or to grant political 
asylum to a Kurdish rebel leader). 
Id. 
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 2172. 
198 Id. at 2173.  See generally Michiel Leezenberg, Power in Communication:  Implications for 
the Semantics-Pragmatics Interface, 34 J. PRAGMATICS 893, 898 (2002) (contending “that the 
efficacy of, say, performative language[,] cannot be wholly characterized in terms of the 
powers conventionally associated with words, but also depends on the power or status 
function conferred on the person uttering them”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 2 [2009], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss2/1
2009] Death Penalty Appeals 505 
safeguard the integrity of criminal proceedings and the legal profession.  
But in addition to thwarting State efforts to dictate the conditions and 
meaning of death, the volunteer may be considered a rebellious spirit in 
a less dramatic, albeit no less significant, way.   
According to Nugent, the State’s “unending iterative productions—
its everyday bureaucratic routines, its formulaic documentary practices, 
and its magnificent public rituals—establish for it a seemingly neutral, 
objective vantage point that stands ‘above’ or ‘outside’ the social order, 
watching, preserving, safeguarding.”199  Through its “endless production 
and circulation of documents,” Nugent continues, the State “never 
stop[s] talking.”200  Applying Nugent’s contentions regarding the State to 
situations involving capital defendants, one could argue that the State 
benefits not so much from the execution, but from the lengthy death 
penalty litigation process.  In this light, the “docile body”—the “useful” 
death row inmate—is not the one whom the State can execute when it is 
convenient and necessary as a symbol of State power, but all death row 
inmates who help establish the State’s ongoing claim to authority 
through its endless production and circulation of briefs, motions, and 
opinions.  In this way, “volunteering” could serve as an act of resistance 
or opposition to bio-power not by undermining the power of the 
sovereign when the State does not wish to flex its muscle—by beating 
the State to the punch, so to speak—but by effectively shutting the State 
up—by (prematurely) ending the conversation and doing so on the 
inmate’s own terms. 
                                                 
199 David Nugent, Dark Fantasies of State:  Notes from the Peruvian Underground (Draft) 
(presented at “Off-Centered States:  Political Formation and Deformation in the Andes,” 
Institute for Comparative and International Studies, Emory University) (Sept. 28–29, 2007) 
(manuscript on file with author). 
200 Id. at 21.  See also Shannon Speed, Exercising Rights and Reconfiguring Resistance in the 
Zapatista Juntas de Buen Gobierno, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS:  TRACKING LAW 
BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 163, 178 (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 
2007) (suggesting that pursuing social struggle by petitioning the state through the legal 
system for the establishment of ‘rights’ may serve to buttress the neoliberal state’s role as 
the purveyor and protector of rights, and as upholder of ‘law and order.’”).  See generally 
Jean E. Jackson, Rights to Indigenous Culture in Colombia, in THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS:  TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND THE LOCAL 204, 229 (Mark Goodale & 
Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007) (contending that “the state is not a unitary center of power, 
but in fact is composed of institutions like legislatures and judiciaries whose individual 
actors engage in discourses and practices of power, the multiple effects of which give the 
appearance of a state”) (citing JAMES C. SCOTT, DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE:  
HIDDEN TRANSCRIPTS (2003); Maddening States, 32 ANN. R. ANTHROPOLOGY 393–410 (2001); 
Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, The Anthropology of the State in the Age of Globalization:  Close 
Encounters of the Deceptive Kind, 42 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 125, 125–38 (2001)). 
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V.  CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This Article has attempted to set forth a conceptual framework with 
which to understand the power dynamics that exist between the State 
and the condemned prisoner wishing to waive or withdraw his death 
penalty appeals.  Using Foucauldian notions of discipline and bio-power, 
as well as Hardt and Negri’s formulation of an “opposite” of bio-power, 
this Article has considered the motivations of the volunteer and the 
interests of the State and then classified the volunteer as either a “docile 
body” or a “rebellious spirit.”  Admittedly, the presentation of the 
options is quite stark.  But the intent has not been to exclude the 
potential for a continuum (or even a non-Foucauldian contemplation of 
volunteering).  Rather, the goal has been to offer a starting point for 
understanding who ultimately controls the body of the condemned, and 
to offer an instrument for exploring and contemplating the continued 
rationale for the death penalty and the purpose it may serve as a social 
phenomenon. 
As mentioned at the outset of this Article, death penalty 
jurisprudence in the United States is at a critical juncture.  Although Baze 
did not directly address the issue of volunteering for execution, the 
outcome of the case may well affect the waiver and withdrawal of death 
penalty appeals.  Had the Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits methods of execution that create an “unnecessary 
risk of pain and suffering”—effectively requiring a new method of lethal 
injection—more death row inmates might now be volunteering because 
of the perception that the new method(s) will cause less pain.201  But such 
a ruling could also have resulted in fewer volunteers if the language of 
the opinion had suggested that abolition might be forthcoming.  As it 
turned out, the Supreme Court’s holding sanctions the existing 
cocktail.202   Some individuals on death row have continued to press their 
appeals.203  Others, such as David Mark Hill (executed on June 6, 2008) 
and Marco Allen Chapman (executed on November 21, 2008) have 
                                                 
201 See Essig, supra note 2, at WK15.  According to one commentator, a new cocktail 
would serve as no guarantee of pain-free executions.  Id.  “[D]ecades of executions have 
taught us this:  Technical systems are prone to failure, and human bodies are irreducibly 
complex and idiosyncratic.  Whatever the technique, executions will go horrifyingly 
wrong.”  Id. 
202 Such a holding, by no means, requires states to use the existing cocktail.  In the 
aftermath of Baze, states are free to continue to do so or to come up with a newer, less 
painful method. 
203 See, e.g., Andrew Welsh-Huggins, Ohio Inmate Says He’s Too Fat For Execution (Aug. 5, 
2008), http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080804/ap_on_re_us/death_penalty_cooey (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2008). 
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waived their appeals.204  (Michael Rodriguez labored for more than a 
year to convince courts that he was competent to drop his appeals;205 he 
was finally executed on August 14, 2008.206)  Still others, seeking a 
“macho confrontation with death”207 might volunteer, knowing that 
doing so would generate some element of publicity and prestige—
especially in light of the Court’s decision.  Additional research will be 
needed to understand the impact of Baze on the waiver and withdrawal 
of death penalty appeals. 
Perhaps more significant than couching the issue of death penalty 
volunteering in the context of Baze, this Article, using the issue of waiver 
and withdrawal of death penalty appeals as a domain through which 
meanings, practice, identities, and relations are defined and contested, 
has attempted to set forth a conceptual framework with which to 
understand the power dynamics that exist between the death row inmate 
and the State.  While the focus of this Article has clearly been on the 
ways in which death penalty volunteering affects those power relations 
between the condemned prisoner and the State, it speaks to and is part of 
broader social processes and issues of power, including the place of 
capital punishment in a wider socio-political network.208  As Ohnuki-
Tierney acknowledges, “[t]here have always been culturally sanctioned 
ways of terminating human life, including wars and other purposeful 
killings.”209  Additional avenues of inquiry are needed to help shed light 
on the death penalty’s role in contemporary society210—essentially, the 
“what” or “why” of power in contrast to Foucault’s epistemic “how.”211 
                                                 
204 Associated Press, National Briefing—South: South Carolina:  Killer Is Executed, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 7, 2008, at A12; Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/getexecdata.php (last visited Jan. 19, 2009). 
205 Michael Graczyk, Texas 7 Member Volunteers for Execution this Week, YAHOO! NEWS 
(Aug. 10, 2008), http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080810/ap_on_re_us/texas7_execution& 
printer=1;_ylt=AlbN_d0flgNXlP2UCChT38lH2ocA. 
206 See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Database, http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/getexecdata.php (last visited Dec. 08. 2007). 
207 Harrington, A Community Divided, supra note 12, at 850. 
208 This type of approach is well-articulated by David Garland.  See GARLAND, supra note 
135, at 3–22.  For a recent evolutionary perspective on why people punish and how 
punishment becomes established within populations, see Robert Boyd & Sarah Matthew, A 
Narrow Road to Cooperation, 316 SCI. 1858, 1858–59 (2007). 
209 Ohnuki-Tierney, supra note 15, at 239.  See also Kalervo Oberg, Crime and Punishment in 
Tlingit Society, 36 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 145, 145–56 (1934); Keith F. Otterbein, On 
Reconsidering Violence in Simple Human Societies, 29 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 633, 635 
(1988); Paredes, supra note 145, at 16 (referring to capital punishment as a “cross-cultural 
universal”). 
210 For example, one might consider Solomon’s contention that “capital punishment 
legitimizes killing as a way to deal with problems.”  Solomon, supra note 150, at 443. 
211 KNAUFT, supra note 185, at 157. 
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For example, as this Article has noted, in the United States the trend 
has been to move away from painful executions.  As Essig recently 
remarked: 
 It was only in the 1850s or so that Americans became 
squeamish about the pain suffered by executed 
prisoners.  Before that, pain wasn’t a problem; it was the 
point.  Through drawing and quartering, beheading, 
shooting[,] or hanging, the state inscribed its power on 
the body of the convict and provided a lesson in the 
perils of disobedience.212 
Similarly, Weil has mused: 
 The history of capital punishment in the United 
States has been filled with a peripatetic search for a 
method of killing that doesn’t offend a blood-thirsty, yet 
tough-on-crime, yet squeamish public.  Nooses, if the 
drop is too short, leave bodies twitching; if the drop is 
too long, heads pop off.  Electric chairs result in horrible 
odors and burns.  Firing squads are too violent.  Gas 
chambers take too long and are too grotesque.  (One 
1992 lethal gas execution in Arizona caused an attorney 
general to throw up and a warden to threaten to quit if 
he had to execute by that method again.)213  
Gradually, overt fetishistic fascinations with painful, bloody 
punishment and executions have given way to a preference for quiet, 
                                                 
212 Essig, supra note 2, at WK15.  See generally Edward Lewine, Bitter Pill, NEW YORK 
TIMES BOOK REVIEW, Dec. 2, 2007, at 68 (reviewing HAROLD SCHECHTER, THE DEVIL’S 
GENTLEMAN:  PRIVILEGE, POISON, AND THE TRIAL THAT USHERED IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (2008)) (asking “Who knew . . . that the 19th century had a very different crime 
obsession than we do now?”). 
213 Weil, supra note 1, at WK3.  See also Essig, supra note 2, at WK15 (“Starting in the 
1850s, such sensitivities [to prisoner pain and prolonged suffering] gave rise first to 
improved hanging methods and later to the electric chair, the gas chamber[,] and lethal 
injection.  Each method was promoted as less painful for the prisoner and less emotionally 
fraught for those who watch.”).  See generally Theo Emery, Tennessee, After Review, Sets 
Execution, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2007, at A19 (reporting that “Florida suspended executions 
late last year after it took 34 minutes for an inmate to die, and Ohio re-examined its 
procedures after it took 90 minutes to put an inmate to death last May”); Friend, supra note 
56, at 70 (explaining that some regarded the execution of Stanley “Tookie” Williams, 
founder of the Crips and later nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his helping to 
broker gang truces, as a “prolonged ‘torture-murder’”). 
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antiseptic, and comparatively private capital punishment.214  Or so it 
seems.  Despite questions as to whether the death penalty does indeed 
deter violent crimes,215 American society has been unwilling to part with 
capital punishment—for the “alleged social benefits [of] retributive 
justice and deterrence[.]”216  If American society genuinely rejects 
gruesome displays of prolonged pain and agony experienced by bodies 
suffering unspeakable pain and if there exists serious doubts about the 
alleged social benefits,217 one must ask why the death penalty has 
continued to persevere.218  Some commentators speculate that “the new 
focus on terrorism in the United States . . . [has] helped to keep the 
federal death penalty alive and public opinion about capital punishment 
in an ambivalent state.”219  While this is certainly a possibility—for 
                                                 
214 See generally Adam Liptak, Florida Panel Urges Steps for Painless Executions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 2007, at A12 (“Opponents of the paralytic chemical [used in lethal injection] say it 
serves no legitimate purpose and may mask agonizing pain.  But corrections officials say 
using other methods would take too long and could subject witnesses to discomfort.”). 
215 Compare James R. Acker, Impose an Immediate Moratorium on Executions, 6 CRIMINOLOGY 
& PUB. POL’Y 641, 645 (2007) (calling into question “the utility of capital punishment, 
including its efficacy in deterring murder,” and pointing to findings that “strongly suggest 
that capital punishment is not a superior deterrent to murder than is life imprisonment”), 
and Burr, supra note 40, at 14 (stating that 
we can show that over the years in which the death penalty has been 
with us, it has never been demonstrated to deter violent crimes.  At 
best, it has no effect—at worst, by sanctioning the deliberate killing of 
one another, it encourages homicide. . . .  The death penalty is not a 
deterrent to violent crime. 
), and Paredes and Purdum, supra note 79, at 9 (ruminating that “capital punishment does 
no more to deter crime than the rituals of Tenochtitlan did to keep the sun in the sky[]”), 
with Reuben M. Greenberg, Race, the Criminal Justice System, and Community-Oriented 
Policing, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 397, 400 (1997) (“In reality, no one knows for certain 
whether the death penalty is a deterrent.  However, common sense suggests that it might 
be, and the need to protect the public from the most vicious offendors [sic] justifies taking 
this punitive action.”), and Adam Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, at 1, 24 (reporting on recent studies that have found that the death 
penalty prevents murders), and Jeremy W. Peters, Move To Repeal Death Penalty in New 
Jersey, Where It’s Mainly Academic, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at A24 (same).  
216 Essig, supra note 2, at WK15.  See also Harrington, Mental Competence and End-of-Life 
Decision Making, supra note 11, at 1112 n.3 (noting the importance of the societal goals of 
retribution and deterrence). 
217 But see Greenberg, supra note 214, at 400; Liptak, supra note 214, at 24; Peters, supra 
note 214, at A24.  
218 See Otterbein, supra note 209, at 635.  According to at least one anthropologist, “capital 
punishment is found in all or nearly all societies[.]”  Id. 
219 KUDLAC, supra note 7, at xvi.  According to Kudlac,  
[b]y 1994, growing opposition to the death penalty was becoming 
visible across the country.  The Oklahoma City bombing and 
subsequent arrest of Timothy McVeigh in 1995 arguably affected this 
trend by reinvigorating many people’s support for capital punishment.  
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“[p]unishment . . . is not reducible to a single meaning or a single 
purpose”220—the author of this Article is cautious of “instrumental, 
punishment-as-crime-control conception[s.]”221  Instead, this author 
questions whether secret and (albeit somewhat attenuated) sadistic 
pleasures may still permeate the collective subconscious—pleasures that 
may be better understood through an examination of public interest in 
the “bifurcated spectacle” of trial (and sentencing) on the one hand and 
execution on the other,222 as well as through the continued study of the 
growth and popularity of violent forms of entertainment (television 
shows, including news programs, movies, and video games).223  Future 
                                                                                                             
In addition, the new threat of terrorism was used to justify the 
continued practice of the death penalty. 
Id. at xv. 
220 GARLAND, supra note 135, at 17. 
221 Id. at 19. 
222 See Kai T. Erikson, Notes on the Sociology of Deviance, 9 SOC. PROBS. 307, 310 (1962) ( 
In an earlier day, correction of deviant offenders took place in the 
public market and gave the crowd a chance to display its interest in a 
direct, active way.  In our own day, the guilty are no longer paraded in 
public places, but instead we are confronted by a heavy flow of 
newspaper and radio reports which offer much the same kind of 
entertainment. 
).  See generally Jeff Ferrell, Criminalizing Popular Culture, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, AND 
JUSTICE 71, 71–83 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998) (describing the role of the 
mass media in presenting, re-presenting, and constructing criminality); KUDLAC, supra note 
7, at 102 (describing how in the cases of Bundy, Gacy, Wuornos, and Tucker, “[o]nce the 
verdict was rendered, the case dropped out of the headlines until an announcement of a 
scheduled execution date.  The media typically ignores the correctional system.”).  Cf. 
FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 9 (asserting that “the publicity has shifted to the trial, and to 
the sentence; the execution itself is like an additional shame that justice is ashamed to 
impose on the condemned man[]”). 
223 See Geoffrey Gorer, The Pornography of Death, reprinted in GEOFFREY GORER, DEATH, 
GRIEF, AND MOURNING 192, 197 (1965).  This inquiry itself is by no means new.  See id.  More 
than fifty years ago, George Gorer argued that “violent death has played an ever-growing 
part in the fantasies offered to mass audiences—detective stories, thrillers, Westerns, war 
stories, spy stories, science fiction, and eventually horror comics.”  Id. 
 For examples of scholarly inquiries into, and analysis of, media constructions and 
depictions of crime, including local and national newspaper coverage of crime and crime 
control, as well as the portrayal and production of crime, criminals, justice, juvenile 
delinquency, and violence in film, television, cyberspace, popular music, comic books and 
other popular culture texts, see CHARLES R. ACLAND, YOUTH, MURDER, SPECTACLE:  THE 
CULTURAL POLITICS OF “YOUTH IN CRISIS” (1995); Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale, 
Popular Culture, Crime, and Justice, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 1, 1–20 (Frankie 
Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); MEDIA, PROCESS, AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
CRIME:  STUDIES IN NEWSMAKING CRIMINOLOGY (Gregg Barak ed., 1994); Gregg Barak, 
Media, Crime, and Justice:  A Case for Constitutive Criminology, in CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 
142, 142–66 (Jeff Ferrell & Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); REPRESENTING O.J.:  MURDER, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MASS CULTURE (Gregg Barak ed., 1996); Henry H. Brownstein, The 
Media and the Construction of Random Drug Violence, in CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 45, 45–65 
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(Jeff Ferrell & Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); Derral Cheatwood, Prison Movies:  Films About 
Adult, Male, Civilian Prisons:  1929–1995, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 209, 209–31 
(Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); STEVEN M. CHERMAK, VICTIMS IN THE NEWS:  
CRIME AND THE AMERICAN NEWS MEDIA (1995); Steven M. Chermak, The Presentation of 
Drugs in the News Media:  The News Sources Involves in the Construction of Social Problems, 14 
JUST. Q. 687, 687–718 (1997); Steven M. Chermak, Police, Courts, and Corrections in the Media, 
in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 87, 87–99 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 
1998); STEVE CHIBNALL, LAW AND ORDER NEWS:  AN ANALYSIS OF CRIME REPORTING IN THE 
BRITISH PRESS (1977); THE MANUFACTURE OF NEWS:  DEVIANCE, SOCIAL PROBLEMS, AND THE 
MASS MEDIA (Stanley Cohen & Jock Young eds., 1973); ENTERTAINING CRIME:  TELEVISION 
REALITY PROGRAMS (Gray Cavendar & Mark Fishman eds., 1998); C. Greek, O.J. and The 
Internet:  The First Cybertrial, in REPRESENTING O.J.:  MURDER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MASS 
CULTURE 64, 64–77 (Gregg Barak ed., 1996); STUART HALL, ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS:  
MUGGING, THE STATE, AND LAW AND ORDER (1978); A. Howe, The War Against Women:  
Media Representations of Men’s Violence Against Women in Australia, 3 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 59, 59–75 (1997); PHILLIP JENKINS, USING MURDER:  THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
SERIAL HOMICIDE (1994); David Kidd-Hewitt, Crime and the media:  A Criminological 
Perspective, in CRIME AND THE MEDIA:  THE POST-MODERN SPECTACLE 1, 1–24 (David Kidd-
Hewitt & Richard Osborne eds., 1995); PAUL KOOISTRA, CRIMINALS AS HEROES: STRUCTURE, 
POWER, AND IDENTITY (1989); Gary T. Marx, Electric Eye in the Sky:  Some Reflections on the 
New Surveillance and Popular Culture, in CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 106, 106–41 (Jeff Ferrell & 
Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); Graeme Newman, Popular Culture and Violence:  Decoding the 
Violence of Popular Movies, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 40, 40–56 (Frankie Y. 
Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); Jeffrey Niesel, The Horror of Everyday Life:  Taxidermy, 
Aesthetics, and Consumption in Horror Films, in INTERROGATING POPULAR CULTURE:  
DEVIANCE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL ORDER 16, 16–31 (Sean E. Anderson & Gregory J. Howard 
eds., 1998); Amy Kiste Nyberg, Comic Books and Juvenile Delinquency:  A Historical 
Perspective, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 61, 61–70 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. 
Hale eds., 1998); P.A. Perrone & Meda Chesney-Lind, Representations of Gangs and 
Delinquency:  Wild in the Streets, 24 SOC. JUST. 96, 96–116 (1997); David P. Phillips, The Impact 
of Mass Media Violence on U.S. Homicide, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 560. 560–68 (1983); NEIL POSTMAN, 
AMUSING OURSELVES TO DEATH:  PUBLIC DISCOURSE IN THE AGE OF SHOWBUSINESS (1986); 
CONSTRUCTING CRIME:  PERSPECTIVES ON MAKING NEWS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS (Gary W. 
Potter & Victor E. Kappeler, eds., 2006); C. Reinarman & C. Duskin, Dominant Ideology and 
Drugs in the Media, 3 INTERN. J. DRUG POL. 6, 6–15 (1992); Clinton R. Sanders & Eleanor 
Lyon, Repetitive Retribution:  Media Images and the Cultural Construction of Criminal Justice, in 
CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY 25, 25–44 (Jeff Ferrell & Clinton R. Sanders eds., 1995); RICHARD 
SPARKS, TELEVISION AND THE DRAMA OF CRIME:  MORAL TALES AND THE PLACE OF CRIME IN 
PUBLIC LIFE (1992); Richard Sparks, Entertaining the Crisis:  Television and Moral Enterprise, in 
CRIME AND THE MEDIA:  THE POST-MODERN SPECTACLE 49, 49–66 (David Kidd-Hewitt & 
Richard Osborne eds., 1995); RAY SURETTE, MEDIA, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  IMAGES 
AND REALITIES (1998); Sara Thornton, Moral Panic, The Media, and British Rave Culture, in 
ALAN ROSS & TRICIA ROSE, MICROPHONE FIENDS:  YOUTH MUSIC AND YOUTH CULTURE 176, 
176–92 (1994); Kenneth D. Tunnell, Reflections on Crime, Criminals, and Control in 
Newsmagazine Television Programs, in POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 100, 100–10 
(Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 1998); Neil Websdale & Alexander Alvarez, 
Forensic Journalism as Patriarchal Ideology:  The Newspaper Construction of Homicide-Suicide, in 
POPULAR CULTURE, CRIME, & JUSTICE 123, 123–41 (Frankie Y. Bailey & Donna C. Hale eds., 
1998); and Jeff Williams, Comics:  A Tool of Subversion, in INTERROGATING POPULAR 
CULTURE: DEVIANCE, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL ORDER 97, 97–115 (Sean E. Anderson & Gregory 
J. Howard eds., 1998).  Even Foucault himself suggested that “[i]t is the criminal . . . that is 
needed by the press and public opinion.”  FOUCAULT, supra note 137, at 432.  See Jeff 
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inquiries might well consider whether “the gloomy festival of 
punishment”224 has indeed died out—whether “[p]unishment [has, in 
fact,] gradually ceased to be a spectacle[]”225—or whether its “visible 
intensity” has just been transformed. 
                                                                                                             
Ferrell, Cultural Criminology, 25 ANNU. REV. SOCIOL. 395, 397, 408 (1999).  More recently, Jeff 
Ferrell has explored the “spectacle and carnival of crime[]” and the ways in which “the 
mass media constructs crime as entertainment[.]”  Id. at 408; see id. at 407, 408–09, 411.  See 
also Simon Hallsworth, It’s Good To Watch:  Cruelty, Transgression and Popular Culture, (Paper 
presented at On the Edge:  Transgression and The Dangerous Other:  An Interdisciplinary 
Conference, John Jay College of Criminal Justice and The Graduate Center, City University 
of New York) (Aug. 9, 2007) (on file with author).  Simon Hallsworth has made continued 
progress in revealing and explaining the ways in which various groups produce and 
consume images of crime—especially with respect to how television crime dramas affect 
the production and perception of crime and policing imagery.  Id. 
 The author of this Article would encourage further investigations into how crime is 
depicted and portrayed by various media and the ways in which crime, crime news, and 
crime entertainment have become entangled and blurred.  But the author of this Article 
would urge specific focus on depictions of torture in recent horror movies (such as the Saw 
series, Untraceable (Cohen/Pearl Productions 2008), The Texas Chainsaw Massacre:  The 
Beginning (New Line 2006)) and inquiries into whether these films—these “hundreds of 
tiny theatres of punishment”—have replaced the (pleasure derived from the) spectacles of 
execution from yesteryear.  See FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 113.  See also Stanley Cohen, The 
Punitive City:  Notes on the Dispersal of Social Control, 3 CONTEMP. CRISES 339, 359 (1979). 
224 FOUCAULT, supra note 60, at 8. 
225 Id. at 9.  See also Anton Blok, The Symbolic Vocabulary of Public Executions, in HISTORY 
AND POWER IN THE STUDY OF LAW:  NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY 31, 46–52 
(June Starr and Jane F. Collier eds., 1989) (discussing the decline of the “[t]heater of 
[p]unishments”). 
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